Dimaya Redux at the Supreme Court? – Update for January 7, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI TO 924(C) CASE

After the Supreme Court decision last spring in Sessions v. Dimaya, a lot of people doing time for using a gun during a crime of violence had hoped to attack their 18 USC 924(c) convictions by arguing the underlying crime was not violent.

gunb160201Section 924(c) outlaws using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense or “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in subsection (c)(3)(B) to be a crime in which force is used or threatened against the person or property of another (the “elements clause”) or any a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense,” known as the residual clause.

In Johnson v. United States and, later, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court invalidated similar residual clauses as violating due process because of vagueness.

After Dimaya, the courts of appeal entertained a spate of cases arguing that if 18 USC 16(b) (the residual clause found unconstitutional in Dimaya) was invalid, so was the identically-worded clause in § 924(c)(3)(B). Last September, the 5th Circuit became the first appellate court to decide the matter, holding in United States v. Davis that it would use the same “categorical approach” approved by the Supreme Court in Johnson and Dimaya when applying § 924(c)(3)(B) to the underlying offense. Doing so, the Court said, there was no doubt that 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutional.

A number of other circuits have differed with the 5th since then. Most recently, the 2nd ruled in United States v. Barrett and the 11th held in Ovalles v. United States that § 924(c)(3)(B) survives Johnson and Dimaya. Those circuits agree that, first, 18 USC 924(c) is a criminal offense that requires a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the underlying offense by a jury in the same proceeding. For that reason, the categorical approach – which requires a reviewing court to ‘imagine’ an “idealized ordinary case of the crime” and which would render the 924(c) residual clause unconstitutional – need not be employed. Instead, those circuits used a conduct-based approach, looking at how the defendant actually committed the underlying crime instead of employing some “least violent hypothetical.” See “Circuits Busy Shutting Down 924(C) Dimaya Claims,” Newsletter, Oct. 8, 2018.

scotus161130Naturally, the government prefers the approach favored by every court except the 5th Circuit. Last Friday, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari to challenge the 5th Circuit’s use of the categorical approach in Davis. In that case, the 5th held the defendants’ 924(c) conviction could not stand, because it was based on conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. A conspiracy itself does not use force or threat of force, the Circuit reasoned, so it only could be a crime of violence under 924(c)’s residual clause. Because that clause was identical to the crime of violence residual clause declared unconstitutional in Dimaya, the 5th Circuit held conspiracy to commit a crime of violence could not constitutionally support a 924(c) conviction under the residual clause in that statute, either.

It is possible there will be a decision by June, but it is more likely the case will not be argued until the fall.

United States v. Davis, Case No. 18-431 (certiorari granted Jan. 4, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

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