1	Terry W. Bird – Bar No. 49038	Donald Specter – Bar No. 83925	
	tbird@birdmarella.com	dspecter@prisonlaw.com	
2	Dorothy Wolpert – Bar No. 73213 dwolpert@birdmarella.com	Sara Norman – Bar No. 189536 snorman@prisonlaw.com	
3	Shoshana E. Bannett – Bar No. 241977	Sophie Hart – Bar No. 321663	
4	sbannett@birdmarella.com Kate S. Shin – Bar No. 279867	sophieh@prisonlaw.com Patrick Booth – Bar. No. 328783	
5	kshin@birdmarella.com Oliver Rocos – Bar No. 319059	patrick@prisonlaw.com Jacob J. Hutt – MJP No. 804428	
	orocos@birdmarella.com	jacob@prisonlaw.com	
6	Christopher J. Lee – Bar No. 322140 clee@birdmarella.com	PRISON LAW OFFICE 1917 Fifth Street	
7	BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG &	Berkeley, California 94710 Telephone: (510) 280-2621	
8	RHOW, P.C.	Facsimile: (510) 280-2704	
9	1875 Céntury Park East, 23 rd Floor Los Angeles, California 90067-2561	Peter J. Eliasberg – Bar No. 189110	
10	Los Angeles, California 90067-2561 Telephone: (310) 201-2100 Facsimile: (310) 201-2110	peliasberg@aclusocal.org Peter Bibring – Bar No. 223981	
		pb1br1ng(a)aclusocal.org	
11	Naeun Rim – Bar No. 263558 nrim@manatt.com	ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA	
12	Ima E. Nsien – Bar No. 304096	1313 West 8 th Street	
13	insien@manatt.com David Boyadzhyan – Bar No. 311386	Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 977-9500 Facsimile: (213) 977-5297	
14	dboyadzhyan@manatt.com MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP	Facsimile: (213) 977-5297	
15	2049 Century Park East, Suite 1700	C. Ryan Fisher – Bar No. 312864	
	Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 312-4000	cfisher@manatt.com MANATT. PHELPS & PHILLIPS,	
16	Facsimile: (310) 312-4224	LLP 695 Town Center Drive, 14 th Floor	
17	Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners Richard Garries and Andrew Ybarra	Costa Mesa, CA 92626	
18	Garries and Andrew Toarra	Tele: (714) 371-2500 Facsimile (714) 371-2550	
19	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
20	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIF	ORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION	
21	DICHARD CARRIES, ANDREW	Cara Na. 2:20 04450 CDM DVC	
22	RICHARD GARRIES; ANDREW YBARRA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	Case No. 2:20-cv-04450-CBM-PVCx	
	of all others similarly situated,	NOTICE OF JOINT MOTION AND MOTION FOR	
23	Plaintiff-Petitioners,	CERTIFICATION OF	
24		SETTLEMENT CLASS, PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF	
25	VS.	SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, AND CLASS NOTICE;	
26	LOUIS MILUSNIC, in his capacity as Warden of Lompoc, et al.,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN	
27	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	SUPPORT	
28	Defendant-Respondents.		
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Case	2:20-cv-04450-CBM-PVC	Document 426 Filed 06/10/22 Page 3 of 18 Page ID #:13304
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1	DATED: June 10, 2022	Respectfully submitted,
$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$		Terry W. Bird
4		Dorothy Wolpert Shoshana E. Bannett
5		Kate S. Shin
6		Oliver Rocos Christopher J. Lee
7		Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim,
8		Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.
9		By: /s/ Oliver Rocos
10		Oliver Rocos Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
11		·
12		
13	DATED: June 10, 2022	Donald Specter Sara Norman
14		Sophie Hart
15		Patrick Booth Prison Law Office
16		
17		By: <u>/s/ Sara Norman</u> Sara Norman
18		Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
19		
20	DATED: June 10, 2022	Naeun Rim
21		Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP
22		By: /s/ Naeun Rim
23		Naeun Rim Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
24		1 2000 2 202 2 2022 2 2020 2 2 2
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		- 3 - JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case	2:20-cv-04450-CBM-PVC	Document 426 Filed 06/10/22 Page 4 of 18 Page ID #:13305
1 2 3 4 5	DATED: June 10, 2022	Peter Eliasberg Peter Bibring ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
6		By: /s/ Peter Bibring
7		Peter Bibring
8		Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
9	Dated: June 10, 2022	Respectfully submitted,
10		TRACY L. WILKISON United States Attorney
11		DAVID M. HARRIS Assistant United States Attorney
12		United States Attorney DAVID M. HARRIS Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division JOANNE S. OSINOFF
13		Assistant United States Attorney Chief, General Civil Section
14		/a/ Daniel A. Poek
15		/s/ Daniel A. Beck CHUNG H. HAN
16		DANIEL A. BECK JASMIN YANG
17		PAUL B. GREEN Assistant United States Attorney
18		Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
19		
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		- 4 - JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

After engaging in litigation for the last two years, the parties now jointly seek certification of a settlement class and preliminary approval of a proposed Settlement Agreement that entails dismissal of this action. See Exhibit A. Additionally, the parties seek an order approving notice to the class of a fairness hearing concerning the Settlement Agreement and an order setting a schedule for the fairness hearing. The parties request that unless the Court has any questions, this motion be submitted on the papers and that the Court expedite consideration of the proposed order. The Court should issue an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(c)(1)(C), (e), and (g) certifying the provisional class that was certified on July 14, 2020, Dkt. 45, as the Settlement Class. While Respondents continue to deny the allegations in this action, they consent to the certification of the Settlement Class, the appointment of Plaintiff-Petitioners Richard N. Garries and Andrew G. Ybarra as representatives of the Settlement Class, and the appointment of class counsel.¹

The Court should also grant preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement because it is the product of arm's-length, serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations between experienced and knowledgeable counsel who have actively prosecuted and defended this litigation. Additionally, the notice and schedule for a fairness hearing proposed by the parties will allow an adequate opportunity for class members to review and comment on the Settlement Agreement, and is consistent with the parties' desire for prompt implementation of its terms.

¹ The original named plaintiffs are no longer in custody at Lompoc. The parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the original named plaintiffs and substitute Mr. Garries and Mr. Ybarra as Plainitff-Petitioners in this action, which the Court granted. *See* Dkt. Nos. 419 & 420.

II. <u>BACKGROUND</u>

Petitioners filed suit on May 16, 2020, seeking (1) a "highly expedited process" for review of class members for home confinement, as well as (2) an order seeking improved conditions, including adequate social distancing, access to hygiene supplies and PPE, adequate screening procedures, a system for isolated exposed individuals, adequate medical care for those that contract COVID-19, protections against retaliation, and monitoring to ensure compliance. *See* Dkt. 1 (Complaint). Petitioners moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary class certification. On July 14, 2020, the Court issued an order granting Petitioners' motions in part, converting the requested TRO into a preliminary injunction, and provisionally certifying a class of people in custody at Lompoc over 50 or with underlying health conditions. *See* Dkt. 45.

Home Confinement. On the issue of home confinement, the court's Preliminary Injunction ordered Respondents to make "full and speedy use of their authority under the CARES Act and evaluate each class member's eligibility for home confinement which gives substantial weight to the inmate's risk factors for severe illness and death from COVID-19 based on age (over 50) or Underlying Health Conditions". *See* Dkt. 45. Petitioners also brought a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction, which the Court granted. *See* Dkt. 105.

In January 2021, Petitioners filed a second motion to enforce compliance with the Preliminary Injunction. The magistrate recommended granting in part and denying in part the motion. *See* Dkt. 276. The Court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and ordered Respondents to re-evaluate class members who had been denied home confinement where the only reason given for the denial was the amount of time served or percentage of sentence served, or some other variation of a time component, as well as ordering Respondents to release individuals within one month of approving them for home confinement. *See* Dkt. 290.

On May 25, 2021 Respondents moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

Dkt. 250.

Conditions. On conditions at Lompoc, the Court denied Petitioners' application for a temporary restraining order regarding condition of confinement, finding that Petitioners' request was precluded by disputed facts as to the safety measures implemented at Lompoc. *See* Dkt. 45 at p. 80.

The Court granted Petitioners' request to appoint Dr. Homer Venters as the Court's expert, and approved site visits for Dr. Venters in September 2020, April 2021 and February 2022. *See* Dkts. 101, 239, 367. The purpose of these visits was to determine whether Respondents were complying with applicable COVID standards set by the BOP and the Centers for Disease Control. During each visit, Dr. Venters found areas of compliance and areas where he believed that Respondents were deficient. *Id*.

Respondents dispute the validity of Dr. Venters' reports, and retained expert witnesses to inspect Lompoc and opine on the COVID safety measures at the facility. On May 25, 2021, Respondents moved for summary judgment and to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Dkts. 250, 251. Those motions are still pending.

III. SUMMARY OF KEY PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS

Home Confinement. The Settlement Agreement largely codifies the Preliminary Injunction and the Court's enforcement orders. Specifically, it requires Respondents to comply with Attorney General Barr's March 26 and April 3, 2020 memoranda, the current BOP guidance at the time of each review, and the standards set forth in this Court's orders when making decisions about a request for home confinement. In addition, the agreement requires Respondents to transfer individuals within one month of the decision granting home confinement and, if the transfer does not occur timely Respondents must provide an explanation of the reasons for the delay.

Conditions. The Settlement Agreement requires Respondents to follow BOP

policies for COVID testing, checks for people who exhibit symptoms, screening of workers, and medical isolation practices.

Reporting. The Agreement requires Respondents to provide monthly reports on home confinement reviews and the conditions issues listed above.

Termination. The Agreement will terminate on the earliest of the following dates: a) November 17, 2022, b) the day the national emergency declaration with respect to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) terminates; or c) the day the Attorney General determines that emergency conditions no longer materially affect the functioning of the Bureau of Prisons,

Attorney Fees. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), the parties move the court for an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. Subject to Court approval, the Parties have reached a compromise and Respondents have agreed to pay Plaintiffs' counsel \$375,000 for reasonable fees and expenses.

IV. PROPOSED NOTICE

The parties have agreed to a proposed notice to the class, which is filed as Exhibit B. This form of notice is adequate to provide the class with notice of the proposed Settlement Agreement and the fairness hearing, and it complies with the due process requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Within seven days of the Court granting preliminary approval of the settlement and the notice to the class attached as Exhibit B, Respondents will post the notice in FCC Lompoc, including at locations and in formats accessible to disabled inmates; and post an electronic version of the notice on the electronic bulletin board which is available to all Class Members in FCC Lompoc.

V. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

A. The Court should certify the Settlement Class, appoint Mr. Garries and Mr. Ybarra as Settlement Class Representatives, and Appoint Class Counsel.

The parties ask the Court to certify a Settlement Class defined as:

all current and future people in post-conviction custody at FCI Lompoc and USP Lompoc over the age of 50, and all current and future people in post-conviction custody at FCI Lompoc and USP Lompoc of any age with underlying health conditions, including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; serious heart conditions such as heart failure, coronary artery disease, or cardiomyopathies; Type 2 diabetes; chronic kidney disease; sickle cell disease; immunocompromised state from a solid organ transplant; obesity (body mass index of 30 or higher); asthma; cerebrovascular diseases; cystic fibrosis; hypertension or high blood pressure; immunocompromised state from blood or bone marrow transplant; immune deficiencies, HIV, or those who use corticosteroids, or use other immune weakening medicines; neurologic conditions such as dementia; liver diseases; pulmonary fibrosis; thalassemia; Type 1 diabetes; and smokers (hereinafter, "Underlying Health Conditions").

The above definition is identical to the definition for the provisional class this Court certified in its July 14, 2020 order ("Provisional Class Certification Order"), granting a preliminary injunction and certifying, on a provisional basis, a class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). (Dkt. 45 at 44-48). For the same reasons it certified the provisional class, the Court should also certify the Settlement Class.

The threshold task in determining whether to certify a class for settlement purposes is to examine whether the four requirements of Rule 23(a) are met. *Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, parties seeking certification must show that the action satisfies at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 614; *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022. Many of the qualifying criteria contained in Rule 23(a) and (b) exist to protect the interests of absentee class members and therefore deserve "undiluted, even heightened, attention" in the context of a settlement-only class certification. *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 620.

Rule 23(a) provides that a district court may certify a class only if: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are

1 questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 2 representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 3 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). That is, the class must satisfy the requirements of numerosity, 5 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation to maintain a class action. 6 Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 When considering provisional class certification, the Court found that the 8 original Plaintiff-Petitioners to this action—Yonnedil Carror Torres, Vincent Reed, Felix Samuel Garcia, Andre Brown, and Shawn L. Fears ("Original Named 9 10 Plaintiffs") met the requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 11 12 Without waiving the arguments they made in opposition to provisional class certification, Respondents agree that the same findings made as to numerosity, 13 14 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation the Court previously made 15 apply here to the Settlement Class. 16 Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement for class certification requires the class 17 to be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 18 23(a). There are currently more than 2000 members of the provisional class. 19 (CITE.) The Court should therefore find "the class is so numerous that joinder is 20 impracticable, and therefore the numerosity requirement is met. (Dkt. 45 at 45.) 21

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To satisfy the commonality requirement, there must be questions of law and/or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). To establish commonality, Plaintiff-Petitioners need only point to a single common question to the class. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011). The Court should find, as it did previously, that "all class members have been subjected to significant risk of exposure to COVID-19." (Dkt. 45 at 45.) Common facts still include "the process by Respondents in considering Lompoc inmates for home

confinement and compassionate release are common to the entire putative class,

and common questions exist as to whether Respondents' failure to make prompt and meaningful use of home confinement and compassionate release in light of the pandemic, and disregard of inmates' age and medical conditions in determining eligibility for home confinement and compassionate release violate the Eighth Amendment." (*Id.* at 45-46.)

"Claims are 'typical' if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020. As it did for the Original Named Plaintiffs, the Court should find that the claims of putative Plaintiff-Petitioners Richard N .Garries and Andrew G. Ybarra are typical of the class because Petitioners are currently incarcerated at Lompoc, have been subject to substantial risk of exposure to COVID-19, and have higher risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on their age and/or underlying medical conditions. Mr. Garries is 58 years old, has a body mass index of over 30, and currently suffers from type 2 diabetes and hypertension. (Declaration of Richard Garries ("Garries Decl.") ¶ 3.) Mr. Ybarra is 28 years old, has a body mass index of over 30, and currently suffers hypertension and high liver enzymes indicative of liver disease. (Declaration of Andrew Ybarra ("Ybarra Decl.") ¶ 3.) Both Mr. Garries and Mr. Ybarra "challenge the same process regarding Respondents' failure to make prompt and meaningful use of home confinement and compassionate release" and therefore satisfy the typicality requirement. (Dkt. 45 at 46-47.)

To satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement, Petitioners must show (1) that the putative named plaintiffs have the ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously; (2) that the named plaintiffs have obtained adequate counsel, and (3) that there is no conflict between the named plaintiffs' claims and those asserted on behalf of the class. *Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.*, 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). Counsel for the putative Plaintiff-Petitioners submitted declarations in support of the application for provisional certification detailing their qualifications. (Dkt. 22-1, 22-2, and 22-3.) Respondents

- 11 -

1 did not challenge the adequacy of Petitioners' counsel then and still do not.

adequacy requirement is met. (Dkt. 45 at 47.)

2 | Moreover, there is no conflict between Petitioners and members of the class.

Petitioners have confirmed their willingness to be a "named plaintiff, to serve as a class representative, and to represent the claims of the class vigorously in this action." (Garries Decl. ¶ 4; Ybarra Decl. ¶ 4.) Thus, the Court should again find the

Once the requirements of Rule 23 (a) are satisfied, the action must also be maintainable under one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022. When certifying the provisional class, the Court found that Respondents had acted or refused to act on grounds that applied generally to the provisional class such that final injunctive relief was appropriate to the class as a whole in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). (Dkt. 45 at 45-48). The same finding applies to Settlement Class.

B. The Court should preliminarily approve the stipulated settlement.

The Ninth Circuit maintains a "strong judicial policy" that favors the settlement of class actions. *In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); *Class Plaintiffs v City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). In reviewing a proposed class action settlement agreement, a court first "conducts a preliminary approval or prenotification hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement is 'within the range of possible approval' or, in other words, whether there is 'probable cause' to notify the class of the proposed settlement." *Horton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 855 F. Supp. 825, 827 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (citing *Armstrong v. Board of School Directors*, 616 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1980)); see also *In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.*, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079–80 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.632 (2004) (explaining that courts "must make a preliminary determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms and must direct the preparation of notice of the certification, proposed settlement, and date of the final

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fairness hearing"). "Second, assuming that the court grants preliminary approval and notice is sent to the class, the court conducts a 'fairness' hearing, at which all interested parties are afforded an opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement." Horton, 855 F. Supp. at 827. Preliminary approval entails an initial assessment of the fairness of the proposed settlement made by a court "on the basis" of information already known, supplemented as necessary by briefs, motions, or informal presentations by parties." Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632. Newberg on Class Actions summarizes the preliminary approval criteria as follows: If the preliminary evaluation of the proposed settlement does not disclose grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or of segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys, and

appears to fall within the range of possible approval, the court should direct that notice under Rule 23(e) be given to the class members of a formal fairness hearing, at which arguments and evidence may be presented in support of and in opposition to the settlement.

4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 11:25 (4th Ed. 2002).

The purpose of the preliminary approval process is to determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and thus whether notice to the class of the terms and conditions and the scheduling of a formal fairness hearing is worthwhile. *Id.*; see also Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, No. C-02-4546 VRW, 2006 WL 3050861, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2006). There is an "initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement was negotiated at arm's length by counsel for the class." Murillo v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F.Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Other factors courts consider in assessing a settlement proposal include: "[1] the strength of the plaintiffs' case; [2] the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; [3] the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; [4] the amount offered in settlement; [5] the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; [6] the experience

discretion." Id. (citation omitted).

and views of counsel; [7] the presence of a governmental participant; and [8] the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also In re Oracle Sec. Litig.*, 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The district court must explore these factors to satisfy appellate review, but "the decision to approve or reject a settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026.

Furthermore, courts must give "proper deference to the private consensual decision of the parties." *Id.* at 1027. "[S]ettlement [is] the preferred means of dispute resolution" and that "is especially true in complex class action litigation."

dispute resolution" and that "is especially true in complex class action litigation." *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F. 2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). "[T]he court's intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027 (citing *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625). Thus, a district court's decision to approve a class-action settlement may be reversed "only upon a strong showing that the district court's decision was a clear abuse of

Here, a preliminary review of the relevant considerations easily demonstrates a solid basis for granting the conditional approval requested by this motion. The Settlement Agreement is fair and adequate in that Respondents have agreed to detailed terms that directly address the class claims in this case. The settlement was reached after years of litigation and negotiations between the parties, who were zealously represented by their experienced counsel throughout this litigation.

Further, the outcome of the litigation and the extent of any relief that the class might be awarded if the case went to trial is uncertain, as demonstrated by Respondents' currently pending motions for summary judgment and to dissolve the

preliminary injunction. And proceeding through pre-trial motions, trial, and probable appeal would impose risks, costs, and a substantial delay in the implementation of any remedy in this matter. Given the relief achieved and the risks and costs involved in further litigation, the Settlement Agreement represents a fundamentally "fair, reasonable, and adequate" resolution of the disputed issues and should be preliminarily approved. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(e)(2).

C. The Court should approve the Class Notice.

Rule 23(e) requires notice to the class before the Court grants formal approval to any compromise of the case. The parties have agreed to the form and content of the notice to the class, which is attached as Exhibit B, and which provides reasonable notice of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The means of disseminating the notice will allow an adequate opportunity for the class to review and comment on the settlement. The parties respectfully request that the Court approve the notice and order its dissemination to the class members.

D. The Court should approve the proposed scheduling order and set a date for a fairness hearing concerning the Settlement Agreement.

The parties propose the following time schedule to provide for notice, comment, and final approval of the Stipulated Judgment and for a proposed scheduling order. First, the parties request approximately seven days from the time of the preliminary approval to publish the notice in FCC Lompoc. Second, the parties request fifteen days, following the publication of the notice, during which class members may file comments and objections. Third, the parties request fourteen days from the end of the comment period for the parties to respond to any objections and to move for final approval of the Settlement Agreement. Fourth, the parties request that the fairness hearing be set approximately seven days after the deadline for responding to the objections and filing the motion for final approval.

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VI. **CONCLUSION** 1 For the reasons discussed above, Petitioners and Respondents request that the 2 Court issue preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, approve the form of 3 the proposed notice and order its publication to the class and issue the proposed 4 scheduling order. A proposed order is filed herewith. 5 6 DATED: June 10, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 7 8 Terry W. Bird Dorothy Wolpert 9 Shoshana E. Bannett 10 Kate S. Shin Oliver Rocos 11 Christopher J. Lee Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, 12 Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 13 14 By: /s/ Oliver Rocos Oliver Rocos 15 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1		
2	DATED: June 10, 2022	Donald Specter
3	,	Sara Norman
4		Sophie Hart Patrick Booth
5		Prison Law Office
6		By: /s/ Sara Norman
7		Sara Norman
8		Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
9		
10	DATED: June 10, 2022	Naeun Rim Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP
11		
12		By: <u>/s/ Naeun Rim</u> Naeun Rim
13		Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
14		
15 16	D.A.TED 1 10 2022	Peter Eliasberg
17	DATED: June 10, 2022	Peter Bibring
18		ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
19		
20		By: /s/ Peter Bibring Peter Bibring
21		Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioners
22		
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		- 17 - JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Case	2:20-cv-04450-CBM-PVC	Document 426 Filed 06/10/22 Page 18 of 18 Page ID #:13319
1	Dated: June 10, 2022	Respectfully submitted,
2		TRACY L. WILKISON United States Attorney
3		DAVID M. HARRIS Assistant United States Attorney
4		Chief, Civil Division JOANNE S. OSINOFF
5		United States Attorney DAVID M. HARRIS Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division JOANNE S. OSINOFF Assistant United States Attorney Chief, General Civil Section
6		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
7		/s/ Daniel A. Beck CHUNG H. HAN
8		DANIEL A. BECK
9		JASMIN YANG PAUL B. GREEN
10		Assistant United States Attorney
11		Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
12		
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		- 18 - JOINT MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY