7th Circuit Says Courts Should Look for Reason to Accept Late-Filed Notice of Appeal – Update for July 20, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

Incarcerated pro se litigants generally figure that just about any filing deadline can be extended. And judicial devices like the prison mailbox rule – that provides that a document is filed with a federal court on the day it is deposited in institution legal mail – contribute to the false sense of security that deadlines are more suggestions than mandates.

Mostly this is true. Courts are generally very indulgent of pro se filings that are a few days late. But a few deadlines are not easily overlooked by the courts. One is the deadline set for filing 28 USC § 2255 motions, a deadline fixed by statute that courts cannot extend. Another is the deadline for filing a notice of appeal (NOA) under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4.

Rule 4 sets varying deadlines for filing NOAs depending on whether the claim is civil or criminal and whether the litigation included a government party. There are other twists: anyone would think that a 2255 motion challenging a conviction is a criminal matter with a short-fuse 14-day deadline for filing an NOA. But it’s not: habeas corpus is a civil action, even when it challenges a criminal conviction, so a 2255 NOA would be subject to the 30-day filing deadline under F.R.App.P. 4(a).

But it’s not. Because a habeas corpus necessarily includes the government (or one if its officials or employees) as an adverse party, F.R.App.P. 4(a) extends the deadline for filing a § 2255 or § 2241 NOA to 60 days.

The lax, prisoner-friendly deadlines of F.R.App.P. 4(a) make it easy to forget that in appealing a compassionate release motion under 18 USC 3582(c)(1), a prisoner is appealing a holding in a criminal case. Thus, the NOA deadline is a miserly 14 days under F.R.App.P. 4(b).

John Carter forgot. After his compassionate release was denied, he filed his NOA 21 days later, a week past the deadline. The government moved to dismiss his appeal.

F.R.App.P. 4(b)(4) contains a safety valve for people like John. It permits a district court to grant an extension of not more than 30 days after the original NOA due date. But John never filed an extension request, so he seemed to be out of luck.

Not so, the 7th Circuit said last week. Instead, while the Circuit “encourage[s] litigants to file a motion to present their best arguments for an extension,” it ruled that “considering the plain text of Rule 4(b)(4) (and recognizing that most untimely notices of appeal in criminal cases are filed by unsophisticated pro se prisoners)… if a notice of appeal is filed in a criminal case within Rule 4(b)(4)’s 30-day extension window, we should not dismiss the appeal until the district judge has made a finding on whether an extension of time is justified, even when the appellant has not filed a motion.”

The 7th’s holding joins a consensus among six other circuits that filing within the 30-day window triggers the district court’s obligation to determine whether there is good cause or excusable neglect for late filing. Of course, unless the prisoner files a motion explaining why the NOA was late, it is pretty hard for the district judge to make a favorable finding.

The best idea is to file on time. The next best idea is to file a motion justifying why the NOA is late.

United States v. Carter, Case No. 26-1406, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 21212 (7th Cir. July 17, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

It’s Tough to Show Compassion – Update for July 16, 2026

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COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IS NEITHER EASY NOR ESPECIALLY FAIR

One study and two decisions last week illustrate the depressed state of compassionate release motions filed under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A).

It is almost an article of faith among federal prisoners that among the first motions filed with a district court is a motion for the court to appoint a lawyer to file and argue whatever the movant wants to file. The implicit assumption is that the federal courts have an unlimited number of lawyers on their practitioners’ rolls awaiting such appointments and an unlimited budget to pay them with.

Neither is the case.

In a study published last week in the Ohio State Law Journal, Georgetown University law professor Amanda Rogers reported the jumbled state of affairs across the 94 federal districts regarding the appointment of lawyers to assist inmates with compassionate release motions. While there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel in a post-conviction motion, the short answer is that a few do, a few don’t, and most of the districts are all over the map.

Seventeen districts (18%) appointed the Federal Public Defender office to represent previously represented defendants or those now indigent who may qualify for First Step Act relief or for compassionate release. A few courts limited representation to those who were previously entitled to appointed counsel or who are now unable to hire an attorney, when their potential compassionate release claims are based on medical condition or age.

Thirty-four courts (36%) streamlined disclosure by ordering the United States Probation Office or clerk to disclose the presentence report, BOP SENTRY reports, and other relevant records to the FPD or other counsel “for the purpose of determining eligibility for compassionate release.”

Forty-eight district courts (slightly more than half) have failed to issue any orders to guide appointment of counsel for compassionate release motions, although most of these recognize their discretion to appoint. Professor Rogers wrote that many of the courts “failed to issue similar orders for compassionate release motions… Judges vary greatly across district courts regarding (1) whether their discretion to appoint comes from precedent or statute and (2) what test to apply in appointing counsel in post-conviction motions.”

Most of those courts applied an “interests-of-justice test,” appointing counsel only when they concluded it was within the “interests of justice” to do so. The term is not defined by 18 USC § 3006A (the statute relating to appointment of counsel in criminal cases, and its meaning is thus every bit as squishy as you might think.

A few district courts issued orders that stopped appointment of counsel in compassionate release cases altogether. A few others have not outright prohibited it but have issued orders dissuading judges from appointing counsel in such cases.

Anyone wanting appointed counsel for a compassionate release motion needs a strong factual basis for the motion, the right district court, and plenty of luck.

Luck different from what Montez Hall experienced. From a rough childhood, Montez became an accomplished gang member, doing prior jail time for drugs and weapons possession. In one shooting, Montez or others he was with killed the girlfriend of a rival gang member. Finally, he and some others murdered a soldier after a nightclub altercation.

The Feds swept up the gang, and Montez went down hard. He pled to several racketeering activities, including drug trafficking, robbery, murder, bribery, and extortion, and to  18 USC § 924(j) – use of a gun in a crime where murder resulted. At age 20, Montez got a 30-year federal sentence.

In 2024, Montez filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that his health issues, prison conditions, sentencing disparities, his youth at the time of the crime, and his post-offense rehabilitation supported resentencing him to time served. The district court reduced his sentence by eight years because Montez had engaged in substantial rehabilitative efforts: he had become a suicide watch companion, studied for a degree in business administration, learned new skills, renounced his gang, and began practicing a religion. Also, the court emphasized that Montez’s youth played a role in the crimes: he was just “18 (almost 19) at the time” of the murders.

A few weeks ago, the 6th Circuit reversed the 8-year reduction, holding that district courts can’t consider “youth” or “sentencing disparities” because “facts that existed at sentencing cannot later be construed as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to reduce a final sentence.” And district courts can’t consider a “change in the law” because of the non-retroactivity doctrine. That left only rehabilitation, which failed because 28 USC § 994(t) holds that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.

Meanwhile, last week, the 8th Circuit denied compassionate release to Isaac Loggins, who robbed a series of banks 20 years or so ago and got consecutive 18 USC § 924(c) sentences for using a gun. His 504 months would have been just 240 months if he had been sentenced after the First Step Act passed, and he sought compassionate release due to the gross disparity in his sentence.

If you think the Supreme Court’s Rutherford v. United States decision last May was fatal to Isaac’s motion, you’d be right. And the 8th Circuit agreed, ruling that “[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s binding decision in Rutherford, we hold that the First Step Act’s nonretroactive statutory changes to § 924(c), like other nonretroactive legal changes, cannot, whether offered alone or in combination with other insufficient factual considerations, constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A).”

Rogers, Amanda, Importance of Counsel in Compassionate Release Cases, 86 Ohio State Law Journal 443 (July 9, 2026)

United States v. Hall, Case No. 24-6094, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 18561 (6th Cir. June 25, 2026)

United States v. Loggins, Case No. 24-1488, 24-1569, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 20175 (8th Cir. July 10, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Hunting for ‘Miscarriages of Justice’ in Hunter – Update for July 14, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS WAIVER CASE IGNITES ARGUMENT OVER WHAT CONSTITUTES A ‘MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE’

A Supreme Court decision from last term, Hunter v United States, may seem to be a yawner to many federal prisoners. But some legal commentators are suggesting that the decision, while “murky,” may be “the most important criminal case of the term.”

The importance of Hunter, which held that appellate and collateral attack waivers in plea agreements may not be enforced by the government where to do so would lead to a miscarriage of justice, has already led to a number of Supreme Court GVRs. (A ‘GVR’ is a single SCOTUS order that grants certiorari (the ‘G’), vacates the lower court decision (the ‘V’) and remands the case (the ‘R’) for consideration in light of a new Supreme Court decision that addresses the same issue that the GVR case raises).

An appellate waiver, in which a defendant waives his or her rights to appeal or file a collateral attack except in very limited cases, is a feature of virtually all of the 94% or so of federal criminal cases resolved each year by plea bargain. Some are bare bones. Others are breathtakingly expansive, waiving rights to direct appeal, habeas corpus under 28 USC 2241 and 2255, compassionate release motions, and even retroactive Guidelines changes.

Last month’s GVR list of 17 cases – an unusually large number – suggests that a lot of appellate cases will be exploring the limits of what constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” sufficient to set aside a plea agreement appellate waiver.

Last week, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman listed “a notable group of early test cases for the ‘miscarriage of justice’ limit on the enforceability of sentencing appeal waivers” provided to him by a law professor reader of his blog:

    • A claim that the sentencing judge imposed sex offender registration for a non-registrable offense;
    • A claim that a restitution order was not supported by sufficient evidence;
    • A claim that the sentencing judge failed to give the defendant much less credit for substantial assistance to law enforcement than the government recommended;
    • A claim that defense counsel was ineffective in stipulating that a prior state conviction was a serious violent felony (increasing the federal sentence exposure), even though the ineffectiveness did not affect plea negotiations;
    • A claim that the defendant’s guilty plea to an offense (such as possessing a firearm as a drug user) after SCOTUS decisions (such as Hemani) undercut the constitutionality of the crime;
    • A claim that the sentencing judge erred in applying a Guidelines career offender enhancement to the defendant, which increased his guideline range by 60% or more; and
    • A claim that the sentencing judge imposed a substance abuse testing special condition on a defendant’s supervised release which delegated the frequency of testing to the Probation Office.

The Supreme Court did little more than say that a “miscarriage of justice” was something so outside the bounds of conscience as to call the entire “judicial system into disrepute.” William Otis, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney (and ex officio member of the Sentencing Commission) – a serial antagonist of Prof. Berman on the Sentencing Law and Policy blog site – complained, “I was an appellate lawyer in a big USAO for about 20 years, and I can tell you how many sentences fit that description — pretty darn close to zero.”

Being familiar with Mr. Otis’s positions over the years, I am hardly surprised that he never saw a draconian sentencing issue that shocked his conscience.

Another commentator observed that Hunter seemed to confirm validity of appeal waivers while noting problems with the “contract analogy” – the judicial fiction developed over years of plea agreement jurisprudence that such deals – including the defendant’s waiver of appellate and collateral rights – are just contracts between parties to be judged by the well-developed common law of contracts (leavened by some nod to the fact that the defendant is surrendering constitutional rights while the government is merely forgoing the chance to heap more punishment on its target).

Whether the Hunter “miscarriage of justice” is just a restatement of an existing standard or the dawn of an era where the fundamental balance between a defendant on the one hand and the might of the government on the other is, for now, as “murky” as Prof. Berman and Jonathan Wroblewski suggest it is in their excellent analysis of Hunter.

No doubt, we will see a lot of case-specific litigation in the coming years over when Hunter will let a defendant walk away from an appellate waiver.

Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. —, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2558, 2026 LX 319193, 31 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 811 (June 18, 2026)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Early efforts in the hunt to understand Hunter’s new limits on the enforceability of sentencing appeal waivers (July 8, 2026)

Supreme Court, Order List (June 29, 2026)

Berman and Wroblewski, The Supreme Court Draws a Murky Line; The Sentencing Commission Should Help Clarify It  (June 22, 2026)

 ~ Thomas L. Root

BOP Boldly Foreys Into the 21st Century – Update for July 13, 2026

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IPADS FOR EVERYONE!

Sixteen years after Apple introduced the iPad, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has signed a contract with Securus Technologies to provide all BOP inmates with “corrections-grade tablets.”

Yeah, we’ve been here before. The BOP promised a tablet computer rollout four years ago. But this time (and I know better than to say this), maybe the BOP has it right.

The Bureau has selected Securus, which last year won a contract to replace all of the inmate tablets in the California prison system, as the vendor. The company said in a press release that it already “equips over 1,800 corrections agencies with 80-plus high-grade technology solutions to enhance public safety and optimize facility operations. Their offerings include secure communication, advanced monitoring, and the only corrections-grade Wi-Fi-enabled tablets…”

The tablets are not iPads, of course, but instead custom-built devices with limited features (such as no Internet connectivity). Still, they will to give prisoners access to a range of tools and resources that support reentry and communications with family. The devices will provide secure messaging and video services, and educational and rehabilitative programming.

The platform will also modernize many administrative and operational processes, “such as commissary ordering, request forms, program registrations and other routine workflows,” according to the BOP.

The rollout of the new tablet services will occur in phases across BOP institutions, the BOP said, with no schedule announced. The agency provided a similar phased rollout for the introduction of email, the electronic law library, and individual mp3 music players. The use of a vendor already involved in prison tablet placement and management suggests the rollout is for real.

To be sure, the BOP will benefit from the tablets as much as inmates will, with educational programming that can expand to reach all the people who need it, programs not limited by staff shortages, and paperwork reduction. And that’s not a bad thing. Any new program is likelier to succeed when everyone stands to gain from it. Additionally, reductions in the BOP’s workload may lead to greater responsiveness to legitimate inmate needs.

Not everyone is happy. The Luddites on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Task Force on Defending Constitutional Rights and Exposing Institutional Abuses, and Subcommittee on Delivering on Government Efficiency announced in late May that they had opened a joint investigation into California’s prisoner digital table program, based on reporting by the conservative City Journal that purported to “expose” how some prisoners are exploiting state-issued tablets to sexually exploit women and minors from their jail cells. The City Journal based its revelations on “dozens of death-row inmates, who told us that prisoners in the state system use such devices to watch pornography and have explicit sexual conversations.”

In a letter to California Governor Gavin Newsom, the Republican chairs of those committees demand documents and communications “to inform the Committee’s oversight of federal criminal rehabilitation funding and whether federal funds were used to fund the state’s prisoner digital tablet program.” Oh, and to embarrass a blue state and its high-profile governor…

The tablets lack Internet connectivity, making the likelihood that the allegations are true suspect.

Writing in Forbes last week, Walter Pavlo suggested that the biggest beneficiary of the tablet rollout may be First Step Act programming. He said:

Rather than relying exclusively on classroom instruction, educational content can now be delivered directly to each inmate regardless of whether the institution is operating normally or under restricted movement. Academic courses, literacy instruction, vocational education and evidence-based programming can continue even when inmates are confined to their housing units.

This is particularly significant because Congress has increasingly emphasized evidence-based programming through legislation such as the First Step Act. The law encourages inmates to complete productive activities and recidivism reduction programs, yet prisons have often struggled to provide enough classroom space and instructors to meet demand.

According to Securus, the introduction of tablets in state facilities has been shown to reduce inmate rule infractions by over 20% and make use of contraband cellphones less attractive.

Correctional News, Federal Bureau of Prisons Awards Tablet Contract as Part of Broader Modernization Push (July 10, 2026)

Forbes, Federal Bureau Of Prisons Rolling Out E-Tablets (July 9, 2026)

BOP, Federal Bureau of Prisons Awards Transformational Inmate Tablet Contract to Modernize Communication, Education and Rehabilitation Services (July 8, 2026)

Business Wire, Federal Bureau of Prisons Selects Securus Technologies to Deliver Communications and Digital Infrastructure Nationwide (July 10, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Trump Picks Two for Sentencing Commission – Update for July 10, 2026

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TRUMP NOMINATES TWO FOR SENTENCING COMMISSION

President Trump last week announced the nominations of US District Judge John Cronan (Southern District of New York) and Jason Manion to the US Sentencing Commission.

The Commission has been short two commissioners for 18 months, and the impending loss of two more at the end of this year would have prevented the USSC from taking any action.

Judge Cronan, appointed to the bench by Trump in 2019, spent his career in the DOJ, ending up as Acting Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Jason Manion is General Counsel and Senior Advisor to the White House Task Force to Eliminate Fraud. He previously served as Counselor to the Attorney General and was an Assistant US Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio.

Because of additional looming vacancies, four new commissioners would have to be confirmed by the US Senate to bring the Commission to full strength. However, even approving these two before the end of this year would allow the Commission to continue functioning. Whether the Senate sees this as sufficiently important to act – unlike in Trump’s first term, when the nomination of Judge Henry Hudson withered on the vine (a fate that appointment richly deserved) is unclear.

Truth Social, Nomination of Jason Manion to USSC (June 29, 2026)

Truth Social, Nomination of John Cronan to USSC (June 29, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Another Lucy Football for Clemency – Update for July 9, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

250 PARDONS RUMOR ENDS NOT WITH A BANG BUT A WHIMPER

Remember the Wall Street Journal’s mid-May report that White House officials were considering a plan for President Trump to issue 250 pardons by July 4th to commemorate the USA’s 250th birthday?

The rumor was that the clemency action might happen on June 14th – Flag Day and Trump’s birthday – or on Independence Day. The buzz was amplified by an Atlantic Magazine article last week, which reported that “the White House is discussing a possible announcement of presidential pardons as a centerpiece of the nation’s semiquincentennial celebrations over the Fourth of July weekend, according to 14 people familiar with the conversations. The idea has been described as ‘250 pardons for 250 years,’ an initiative that would put one of the most politically fraught constitutional powers at the forefront of the country’s birthday festivities.”

White House Pardon czar Alice Marie Johnson was said to be behind the initiative.

However, Trump’s 80th birthday came and went. Finally, on Friday, Trump announced his clemency list of 11 people, nine of whom had been convicted of tinkering with diesel emission controls on trucks. Another was a former lobbyist convicted of fraud who, since his release, had donated millions to Republican causes.

No people convicted of drug, gun or sex offenses made the cut.

While The Atlantic and the Wall Street Journal had warned that Trump had not signed off on the “250 for 250” deal, the mere rumor sparked a frenzy among federal prisoners to petition for clemency (or update what was already on file). This predictable result occurred despite law professor and clemency expert Mark Osler warning in April that the Dept of Justice Office of Pardon Attorney is ‘a zombie office, in the sense that they’re assigning numbers to cases that come in, but it’s not clear that anything’s happening beyond that.”

According to a report issued by Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) last December, less than 1% of Trump’s 1,700 pardons and commutations came through the OPA.

The Atlantic, The White House Considers Granting 250 Pardons for the Nation’s Birthday (June 29, 2026)

Wall Street Journal, White House Explores 250 Pardons to Mark America’s 250th Birthday (May 13, 2026)

New Yorker, Donald Trump’s Pardon Economy (April 27, 2026)

Ayanna Pressley, Trump’s Clemency Gap: How Trump’s Pardons are Ignoring the People Who Need Them the Most (December 15, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

SIS Lieutenant Meets the Enemy… In the Mirror – Update for July 7, 2026

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THE UNTOUCHABLES

The poet Juvenal once asked, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”  Who will guard the guards themselves?

Inside the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the answer is the agency’s Special Investigation Service (SIS). SIS investigates both inmates and staff for everything from violations of the rules to criminal misconduct.

But that answer begs the next question. Who will guard the guards who are guarding the guards?

Prisoners tire of ever-increasing limitations on visitors, changes in mail delivery, more frequent shakedowns, all in the name of cutting down on contraband drugs, tobacco, cellphones and the like in the facility. Largely, they don’t think that contraband should be allowed but rather they bridle because the restrictive measures are punitive while ignoring the 9,000-lb elephant in the room, that is, the flow of contraband into prisons by staff.

Recently, the Denver Post reported that SIS Lt. Michael Popma, who works at FCC Florence, has been indicted on charges of conspiracy, bribery, providing contraband in prison and unlawful interception of oral communication. Lt. Popma, whom the Post said “was still employed as a lieutenant” as of last week, is accused of being paid more than $15,000 by an inmate’s family to “smuggle 123 cell phones, 415 electronic nicotine vaporizers and 274 bottles of alcohol into the prison,” according to the indictment.

Popma was hired at Florence in 2014 as a correctional officer and became a lieutenant in 2021. A BOP spokesman told the Post that while the agency “does not discuss potential allegations of staff misconduct or comment on matters that are the subject of legal proceedings… we generally can tell you that the Bureau of Prisons takes our duty seriously to protect the individuals entrusted to our custody as well as maintain the safety of correctional staff and the community.”

Popma, of course, is legally presumed innocent until proven otherwise, just as everyone who is now an inmate once was.

Denver Post, Colorado federal prison employee accused of smuggling cellphones, vapes into facility (June 23, 2026)

Indictment, United States v. Popma, Case No. 26-cr-130 (Doc. 1) (D.Colo, June 2, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

‘Fencing’ With the 4th Amendment – Update for July 6, 2026

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SCOTUS SAYS GEOFENCING IS A 4TH AMENDMENT SEARCH

The Supreme Court last week issued its final criminal decision of the current term (called the “October 2025 term,” because that’s when it started), holding that a “geofence warrant” is a “search” under the 4th Amendment and thus cannot be performed without a warrant.

A geofence search is an electronic method for the government to identify who was within a “geofence,” a defined physical area, during a specific period. It is a type of reverse search, used to identify a suspect when none is known, without the data gathered by the warrant. The government defines a limit, such as a half-mile circle from a jewelry store and then issues a demand that companies like Google produce information about cellphones pinging with their technology within a certain area within a particular time period. If three jewelers were robbed over three weeks, a “geofence” warrant for each area fr each of them will identify which cellphones were nearby during the time of each robbery.

The technique really narrows the number of suspects but also sweeps up location data for thousands of people unconnected to the event being investigated.

Opponents of geofencing argue that the potential for the government to misuse the data, to identify people participating in a protest against ICE, for example, is too great. The government argues that it may gather geofencing data without the need for a search warrant at all.

In Chatrie v. United States, the geofence warrant at issue sent to Google demanded that the tech company search the location histories of every one of its users in order to determine which ones were present in the vicinity of a bank robbery. That information ultimately led to the arrest of Okello Chatrie.

Okello argued that the geofence warrant was insufficient, that it amounted to “an unconstitutional general warrant [that] compelled Google to conduct a fishing expedition through millions of Google accounts, without any basis for believing that any one of them would contain incriminating evidence.”

Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Elena Kagan agreed. “The police conducted a search when they gained access to Location History data,” Kagan wrote. “An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone’s location, and police intrude on that constitutionally protected interest when they demand the information—even though for only a limited time, and from a third-party tech company.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch agreed that Chatrie deserved to win but on the grounds that his “location history data qualifies as his personal property” protected warrantless search by the 4th Amendment.

Chatrie’s impact is uncertain. University of Pennsylvania law professor Michael Levy wrote last week that “[t]here are other geofence cases around the country, including one from a different federal court of appeals, one from Pennsylvania, and one from Colorado. In every one of them, the police had obtained a search warrant. Police and prosecutors have recognized the requirement for a warrant. Questions such as what the government must show to get such a search warrant, and how large the geofence can be, how long the time interval can be will have to wait for another day.”

Chatrie v. United States, Case No. 25-112, 2026 US LEXIS 2878 (June 29, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Federal Prisons to Close! (Well, Only Some of Them) – Update for July 2, 2026

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BOP RETRENCHMENT ANNOUNCED

The Federal Bureau of Prisons said yesterday that it will close at least six prisons, citing “extreme staffing challenges” and crumbling facilities (leaving something like 113 still running in the system).

The announcement represents the most ambitious plan yet to address both the staffing crisis and the need to clean up years of maintenance neglect. The New York Times calls the closure “the most expansive effort to shut down or consolidate federal prisons in response to funding shortages.” Ironically, BOP Director William K. Marshall III announced the plan three days short of the first anniversary of the signing of President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act last July 4th, which gave the BOP a $5 billion one-time infusion to add to staff and fix prisons that are falling apart.

The prisons being closed are low-security facilities FCI Beaumont Low (and adjacent minimum-security camp), FCI Big Spring, and FCI La Tuna (all in Texas); FCI Petersburg Low (Virginia); and the already-shuttered FCI Taft, in the California desert north of Los Angeles (closed almost seven years ago). Additionally, the BOP will decommission the minimum-security satellite camp at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The highest-population facility affected by the closure announcement is FCI Beaumont Low, with 1,651 inmates in the low-security prison and another 514 in the adjacent camp.

The Agency also said it would change FPC Duluth and FCI Morgantown (both minimum-security facilities) to low-security facilities.

Staff freed from duties at the closed facilities in Beaumont, Petersburg and Lexington will be transferred to other co-located facilities. Some from Big Spring and La Tuna – each at least 250 miles from the next-closest BOP facility – will lose their jobs.

According to an unidentified official at the Council of Prison Locals, which served as the BOP employees’ union until the BOP cut ties with it about a year ago, the union had not been aware of the plan to close the facilities until yesterday’s announcement.

The BOP population swelled nearly tenfold between 1980 (about 25,000 prisoners) and over 219,000 in 2013. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and the abolition of federal parole left the system severely overcrowded.

Due in large part to Attorney General Eric Holder’s Smart on Crime Initiative, a policy that reserved the harshest federal penalties for the most serious offenders while reducing the prosecution of some low-level, nonviolent drug cases and later to Trump’s First Step Act, the BOP population has fallen by 30 percent since then.

BOP inmates at the affected institutions only learned that they would be relocated soon to locations not disclosed to them. The closure of these facilities will require the transfer of nearly 4,000 inmates to institutions across the federal system.

Congress observed in the First Step Act that placing prisoners close to their families was not only humane but contributed to rehabilitation. Thus, 18 USC 3621(b) provides that the BOP

shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner’s security designation, the prisoner’s programmatic needs, the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs, any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of Prisons, place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence…

Sadly, that provision has more holes than a Swiss cheese factory. Any minimally competent BOP facility designator can easily find an excuse – bed availability, population management, education or medical needs, and the undefined but expansive “other security concerns” – to place a Hawaiian in New Hampshire or a Floridian in California.

To top it off, § 3621(b) provides that “notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”

In other words, the provision is utterly toothless.

Writing in Forbes, Walter Pavlo observes that “[d]ecades of correctional research have consistently shown that maintaining family connections is one of the strongest predictors of successful reentry and lower rates of recidivism.”  Good luck with that. Pavlo notes that “[f]or thousands of inmates and their families, a prison closure is not just a change in address. It is a significant disruption to the stability they have worked to build while incarcerated.”

To be sure, Marshall has an unenviable task before him. The BOP has a potful of money for repairs over the next few years, but even that is insufficient for the more than $4 billion in maintenance needed. In announcing the closures, Marshall said, “We are a Bureau that acts. These actions are necessary to address longstanding infrastructure and staffing challenges while ensuring the Bureau remains focused on its core mission of operating safe, secure, and efficient correctional facilities. We will support our workforce throughout this transition and responsibly position the agency for the future.”

BOP, Federal Bureau of Prisons Announces Facility Closures and Operational Changes (July 1, 2026)

The New York Times, Bureau of Prisons Will Close Facilities Housing Thousands of Inmates (July 1, 2026)

Forbes, Bureau of Prisons Announces Multiple Facility Closings Citing Budget (July 1, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

A Kick In the Fundament for Felon-in-Possession? – Update for June 30, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

READING IS FUNDAMENTAL. GUNS MAY BE, TOO.

The word “fundamental” is fundamental to a lot of what we do. But as a vulgar kid, I was delighted to find out that the root word here – fundament – also meant “buttocks” or even “anus.” What a hoot that was for me back in 7th grade, when such knowledge carried a lot of juvenile humor with it.

Buttocks aside, “fundamental” carries significant constitutional implication, and the Supreme Court’s deliberate and repeated use of it in last week’s Wolford v. Lopez decision was no accident. In Wolford, the high court held that Hawaii’s restrictive firearms-carry law – that made a person lawfully packing heat get permission from any private owner from a neighbor to a store owner before entering the property – violated the 2nd Amendment. While the holding seems to have nothing to do with felon-in-possession laws, it suggests that SCOTUS is slowly moving toward a decision that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) can be unconstitutional when applied to nonviolent felons.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman noted that the Wolford v Lopez opinion repeatedly referred to the right to possess a gun for self-defense as a “fundamental right” cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 decision that is the great grandfather of modern 2nd Amendment jurisprudence.

Berman suggests the use of the term is no accident:

In this Wolford ruling (as well as last week’s Hemani ruling), the Justices are now acting and talking like the 2nd Amendment is to be regarded and safeguarded like other ‘fundamental Bill of Rights guarantees.’ But if that is true, I do not see how federal and state felon lifetime dispossession laws can be categorically upheld as consistent with the 2nd Amendment. I am unaware of any other fundamental constitutional right — or even fundamental common-law right such as the right of self-defense — that a person could forever lose on the basis of a prior conviction. Would anyone seriously claim that 1st Amendment protected activity, such as writing a book or going to church, could be permanently criminalized by governments if and whenever a person had a prior conviction? If that seems crazy under the 1st Amendment, it would seem modern doctrine also makes it crazy under the 2nd Amendment.

Berman called on SCOTUS to take[] up this issue and… explain what the “fundamental right recognized in Heller” fully means.

It’s not like the Court hasn’t had a chance to do so, as excellent vehicles like Vincent v. United States had been on the relist before whimpering to a certiorari denial.  But like the old Brooklyn Dodgers plaint put it (especially appropriate as the Supremes leave town this week for summer recess), “Just wait until next year…”

Maybe.

Wolford v. Lopez, Case No. 24-1046, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2720 (June 25, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2559 (June 18, 2026)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

Sentencing Law and Policy, If truly a “fundamental right,” how can lifetime felon bans on gun possession square with the 2nd Amendment? (June 25, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root