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GROSS DISPARITIES ARE GROSS BUT NOT ALWAYS REMEDIABLE
Back about 25 years ago, David Luster robbed a bank. And then another one. And another one. And so on. The money was good, but the process was a little too much for the authorities: they caught up with him, and by the time it was over, he was convicted of two counts of armed bank robbery, two 18 USC § 924(c) counts, and an Armed Career Criminal Act (18 USC § 924(e)(2)) count.
Dave was sentenced to 535 months. A lot of that resulted from the second § 924(c) conviction carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years. After the First Step Act passed in 2018, the § 924(c) mandatory minimum fell to 7 years (because Dave brandished a gun). In other words, Dave’s sentence likely would have been more like 320 months or so, and he’d be out now.
Dave moved for a sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he had extraordinary and compelling reasons under USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s “unusually long sentence” standard for the grant of a reduced sentence. He asked the court to consider the gross disparity between his 535 months and the 320 months he would have received under the First Step Act’s revised sentencing scheme, as well as his “exemplary rehabilitation,” strong family-support system, and genuine remorse. Dave emphasized that he was a first-time offender who engaged in “aberrant behavior” and did not pose any further risk to the public after over two decades in prison.
The district court denied his motion, holding that Dave’s reasons were not extraordinary and compelling and that the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentence factors weighed against his release, due primarily to the violent nature of the offense.
Last week, the 11th Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Even though USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) allows courts to consider non-retroactive changes in law that create a “gross disparity,” the Circuit noted, the policy statement is discretionary – stating only that the disparity “may be considered” after giving “full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.” Unlike the other five extraordinary and compelling reasons listed in § 1B1.13(b), only (b)(6) gives the district court the option of finding that unchallenged facts are not “extraordinary and compelling.”
What’s more, the 11th held that Dave’s district court was entitled to deny relief based on the § 3553(a) factors alone. The judge’s emphasis on the violent nature and circumstances of the robberies (including brandishing and placing guns to the victims’ heads) provided an adequate, permissible basis to deny the motion. The weight to give the § 3553(a) factors and the decision to grant a sentence reduction, the Circuit ruled, “remain firmly in the court’s discretion, and the district court’s decision here did not fall outside that range.”
This decision illustrates a practical rule: even where a defendant identifies a major sentencing disparity created by non-retroactive changes in the law, the district court has the authority to reject the disparity as an extraordinary and compelling reason. The other five reasons listed in § 1B1.13(b) are fact-driven: for instance, if you’re going to die of a disease within a few months, that fact is extraordinary and compelling whether the court wants it to be or not. Only (b)(6) lets a court agree that a gross disparity exists due to a change in the law, but refuse to find it justifies relief as an extraordinary and compelling reason.
United States v. Luster, Case No. 24-13731, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 10494 (11th Cir., April 13, 2026)
~ Thomas L. Root





















