Federal Prisons to Close! (Well, Only Some of Them) – Update for July 2, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP RETRENCHMENT ANNOUNCED

The Federal Bureau of Prisons said yesterday that it will close at least six prisons, citing “extreme staffing challenges” and crumbling facilities (leaving something like 113 still running in the system).

The announcement represents the most ambitious plan yet to address both the staffing crisis and the need to clean up years of maintenance neglect. The New York Times calls the closure “the most expansive effort to shut down or consolidate federal prisons in response to funding shortages.” Ironically, BOP Director William K. Marshall III announced the plan three days short of the first anniversary of the signing of President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act last July 4th, which gave the BOP a $5 billion one-time infusion to add to staff and fix prisons that are falling apart.

The prisons being closed are low-security facilities FCI Beaumont Low (and adjacent minimum-security camp), FCI Big Spring, and FCI La Tuna (all in Texas); FCI Petersburg Low (Virginia); and the already-shuttered FCI Taft, in the California desert north of Los Angeles (closed almost seven years ago). Additionally, the BOP will decommission the minimum-security satellite camp at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The highest-population facility affected by the closure announcement is FCI Beaumont Low, with 1,651 inmates in the low-security prison and another 514 in the adjacent camp.

The Agency also said it would change FPC Duluth and FCI Morgantown (both minimum-security facilities) to low-security facilities.

Staff freed from duties at the closed facilities in Beaumont, Petersburg and Lexington will be transferred to other co-located facilities. Some from Big Spring and La Tuna – each at least 250 miles from the next-closest BOP facility – will lose their jobs.

According to an unidentified official at the Council of Prison Locals, which served as the BOP employees’ union until the BOP cut ties with it about a year ago, the union had not been aware of the plan to close the facilities until yesterday’s announcement.

The BOP population swelled nearly tenfold between 1980 (about 25,000 prisoners) and over 219,000 in 2013. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and the abolition of federal parole left the system severely overcrowded.

Due in large part to Attorney General Eric Holder’s Smart on Crime Initiative, a policy that reserved the harshest federal penalties for the most serious offenders while reducing the prosecution of some low-level, nonviolent drug cases and later to Trump’s First Step Act, the BOP population has fallen by 30 percent since then.

BOP inmates at the affected institutions only learned that they would be relocated soon to locations not disclosed to them. The closure of these facilities will require the transfer of nearly 4,000 inmates to institutions across the federal system.

Congress observed in the First Step Act that placing prisoners close to their families was not only humane but contributed to rehabilitation. Thus, 18 USC 3621(b) provides that the BOP

shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner’s security designation, the prisoner’s programmatic needs, the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs, any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of Prisons, place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence…

Sadly, that provision has more holes than a Swiss cheese factory. Any minimally competent BOP facility designator can easily find an excuse – bed availability, population management, education or medical needs, and the undefined but expansive “other security concerns” – to place a Hawaiian in New Hampshire or a Floridian in California.

To top it off, § 3621(b) provides that “notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”

In other words, the provision is utterly toothless.

Writing in Forbes, Walter Pavlo observes that “[d]ecades of correctional research have consistently shown that maintaining family connections is one of the strongest predictors of successful reentry and lower rates of recidivism.”  Good luck with that. Pavlo notes that “[f]or thousands of inmates and their families, a prison closure is not just a change in address. It is a significant disruption to the stability they have worked to build while incarcerated.”

To be sure, Marshall has an unenviable task before him. The BOP has a potful of money for repairs over the next few years, but even that is insufficient for the more than $4 billion in maintenance needed. In announcing the closures, Marshall said, “We are a Bureau that acts. These actions are necessary to address longstanding infrastructure and staffing challenges while ensuring the Bureau remains focused on its core mission of operating safe, secure, and efficient correctional facilities. We will support our workforce throughout this transition and responsibly position the agency for the future.”

BOP, Federal Bureau of Prisons Announces Facility Closures and Operational Changes (July 1, 2026)

The New York Times, Bureau of Prisons Will Close Facilities Housing Thousands of Inmates (July 1, 2026)

Forbes, Bureau of Prisons Announces Multiple Facility Closings Citing Budget (July 1, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

A Kick In the Fundament for Felon-in-Possession? – Update for June 30, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

READING IS FUNDAMENTAL. GUNS MAY BE, TOO.

The word “fundamental” is fundamental to a lot of what we do. But as a vulgar kid, I was delighted to find out that the root word here – fundament – also meant “buttocks” or even “anus.” What a hoot that was for me back in 7th grade, when such knowledge carried a lot of juvenile humor with it.

Buttocks aside, “fundamental” carries significant constitutional implication, and the Supreme Court’s deliberate and repeated use of it in last week’s Wolford v. Lopez decision was no accident. In Wolford, the high court held that Hawaii’s restrictive firearms-carry law – that made a person lawfully packing heat get permission from any private owner from a neighbor to a store owner before entering the property – violated the 2nd Amendment. While the holding seems to have nothing to do with felon-in-possession laws, it suggests that SCOTUS is slowly moving toward a decision that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) can be unconstitutional when applied to nonviolent felons.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman noted that the Wolford v Lopez opinion repeatedly referred to the right to possess a gun for self-defense as a “fundamental right” cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 decision that is the great grandfather of modern 2nd Amendment jurisprudence.

Berman suggests the use of the term is no accident:

In this Wolford ruling (as well as last week’s Hemani ruling), the Justices are now acting and talking like the 2nd Amendment is to be regarded and safeguarded like other ‘fundamental Bill of Rights guarantees.’ But if that is true, I do not see how federal and state felon lifetime dispossession laws can be categorically upheld as consistent with the 2nd Amendment. I am unaware of any other fundamental constitutional right — or even fundamental common-law right such as the right of self-defense — that a person could forever lose on the basis of a prior conviction. Would anyone seriously claim that 1st Amendment protected activity, such as writing a book or going to church, could be permanently criminalized by governments if and whenever a person had a prior conviction? If that seems crazy under the 1st Amendment, it would seem modern doctrine also makes it crazy under the 2nd Amendment.

Berman called on SCOTUS to take[] up this issue and… explain what the “fundamental right recognized in Heller” fully means.

It’s not like the Court hasn’t had a chance to do so, as excellent vehicles like Vincent v. United States had been on the relist before whimpering to a certiorari denial.  But like the old Brooklyn Dodgers plaint put it (especially appropriate as the Supremes leave town this week for summer recess), “Just wait until next year…”

Maybe.

Wolford v. Lopez, Case No. 24-1046, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2720 (June 25, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2559 (June 18, 2026)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

Sentencing Law and Policy, If truly a “fundamental right,” how can lifetime felon bans on gun possession square with the 2nd Amendment? (June 25, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Todd Blanche Slips One by Us – Update for June 29, 2026

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SLEEPER

It’s hardly ever news when the Federal Bureau of Prisons updates one of its program statements, those tributes to bureaucratese that govern everything that goes on in the BOP from designation to flag protocol to use of force against inmates to distribution of toilet paper. The agency has over 300 program statements posted on its website alone, and that list leaves out more than a few the Bureau really doesn’t want people to see.

Program statements are constantly being adopted, updated and changed. In the first half of this year, the BOP has tinkered with over a fifth of the program statements posted at BOP.gov. Few people notice. But one change – a real sleeper – was posted last month, and it took Elizabeth Oyer, the former pardon attorney now turned Internet DOJ critic, to catch the change and note its significance.

Program Statement 5100.08, entitled Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual, regulates how inmates are placed in the appropriate level of BOP facility, be it a minimum-security camp or the ADMAX at Florence or any of the 119 joints in the BOP system. It doesn’t matter who you are. All that matters is how you score on a well-defined matrix that measures everything from your offense and criminal history to your behavior inside to amount of time left to serve and over a dozen other factors.

And the exceptions to placement are well-regulated, too, by what are called “management variables.” A person with a sex-offender variable cannot be placed in a minimum-security camp. A camper needing a particular program or medical care only available at a low-security facility could receive a variable to permit placement at the higher-security prison. There are a lot of valid criticisms of Program Statement 5100.08, but it embodies the best of bureaucracy, what German sociologist Max Weber defines as “a form of general organization characterized by the majority of rules and procedures applied impersonally by specialized agents.”

No longer. In a change notice to P.S. 5100.08 issued in early May, the BOP recognized a new DOJ policy – adopted without fanfare – that gives the Attorney General the power to send any federal prisoner to any prison in the country. Nothing limits the AG’s discretion, not regulation, not the BOP, not P.S. 5100.08.

This change notice could be intended to blunt the firestorm of criticism flowing from Jeffrey Epstein confidante Ghislaine Maxwell, who was sent to a camp despite her sex offense conviction after she sat for an interview last year with Todd Blanche. In the interview, she denied that President Trump had engaged in sexual misconduct with women in Epstein’s orbit. A number of legislators have suggested that designation to a camp – contrary to P.S. 5100.08 policy – was a payoff for her favorable testimony.

The change that Liz Oyer cited last week would, after the fact, give Blanche the power to redesignate Maxwell regardless of BOP policy.  But the policy is a dangerous one. Oyer said the policy means that “[i]f you are facing a federal prison sentence, Todd Blanche has total discretion to decide where you’ll serve your time… Under this rule, Blanche could direct the Bureau of Prisons to put anyone who opposes the Trump Administration in a maximum security prison. if you’re prosecuted for protesting ICE, for example, or for vandalizing Trump’s Reflecting Pool, you could serve your sentence alongside murderers and rapists. Blanche could decide to put all of Trump’s enemies in maximum security prisons. He could put all Democrats in maximum security prisons. There are no limits no checks and no review of his decisions.”

The converse is equally problematic. “This policy permits preferential treatment for Trump’s allies,” Liz Oyer said. “If you’re MAGA, you might go to a minimum security camp, or if you’ve got a couple million bucks to spend, you could buy your way into a halfway house or even home detention. That’s exactly what’s happening with pardons under Donald Trump – the wealthy and the well-connected are paying for special treatment. There’s no reason to think the same thing won’t happen with prison placements.”

Section 3621(b) of Title 18 would seem to limit this kind of wanton designation-selling by directing that “there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status.” The problem comes with the last line of the subsection:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” If there is no right of review – and the provision is pretty unambiguous on that score in depriving federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction – then the AG can do as he or she pleases.

However, one interesting twist: If the AG can designate federal prisoners to whatever level, then the AG could designate someone to serve their entire sentences in a halfway house. What’s more, the AG could delegate the power to designate to a subordinate, such as a US Attorney who could then offer preferential designation as a benefit under plea agreements or cooperation agreements.

And it can all be done very quietly, no public announcement, no fanfare, just a phone call from Todd Blanche to the BOP.

Program Statement 5100.08 CN-3, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual (May 6, 2026)

Youtube, @Lawyeroyer (June 22, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Paper Tiger – Update for June 25, 2026

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IS BIVENS CREAKING TOWARD AN IGNOMINIOUS END?

Two Supreme Court developments this past week do not bode well for the future of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

Bivens, in case you were busy doing something else in 1971 (I was graduating from high school), held that the Constitution implied that people have a private right of action against federal agents, employees, and officials for violations of their rights. A statute – 42 USC 1983 – created a federal right to sue state agents for such violations, but nothing created a similar right where federal employees or agents ran roughshod over your rights.

Bivens arose when federal drug agents kicked down Webster Bivens’ front door searching for drugs. They arrested Web without a warrant, but the drug charges were dismissed by a magistrate judge.  Web sued the agents, alleging a violation of his 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure. 

The government argued that the 4th Amendment does not provide a cause of action for damages but “merely… limit[s] the extent to which the agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a valid exercise of federal power.”  Web Bivens argued that a cause of action could be inferred because constitutional protections would be meaningless without a way to seek a remedy for their violation.

Since the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision, it has upheld the concept of a Bivens action only two other times, once for sex discrimination in a federal employment setting (Davis v. Passman (1979) and once for violation of the 8thAmendment by deliberate indifference to prisoner medical care (Carlson v. Green (1980)). Since 1980, Bivens has been on a long, slow march to irrelevance. Under Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017) and Egbert v. Boule (2022), any claim that is not highly similar to the facts in Bivens (excessive force during arrest), Davis (sex discrimination in federal employment), or Carlson (inadequate care in prison) is a “new context” to which Bivens will not be extended if “there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.”

And the Court always thinks that. On Tuesday, SCOTUS held that a Rastafarian prisoner whose dreadlocks were forcibly shaved by prison guards two weeks before his release – despite his showing the guards a court order saying that he was allowed to keep them – could not sue state employees for money.

Louisiana inmate Damon Landor sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, a federal law that requires states to protect the religious rights of individuals in state institutions. Among other provisions, RLUIPA requires prison officials to reasonably accommodate prisoners’ religious beliefs.

In a 6-to-3 vote dividing the court along ideological lines, the majority said federal law did not allow the prisoner, Damon Landor, to sue individual guards in their private capacity for violations of the RLUIPA.

Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, holding that there were limits to Congress’s power to attach strings to the federal money given to state institutions like the Louisiana prison where Damon was held.

Three justices dissented, warning that the court’s decision would leave few options for state prisoners whose religious rights were violated.

The decision is reminiscent of the apocryphal line attributed to President Andrew Jackson about a Supreme Court decision: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”  While probably never said by Jackson, the point is a good one: a law without an enforcement mechanism is toothless.

Speaking of toothless…

Last Monday, the Supremes granted review in a case brought by a nurse facing a $3 million lawsuit over failing to provide medical care to a federal inmate, a case which promises to finally kill off the all-but-moribund Bivens.

Francis Nielsen, who worked at a federal prison in Honolulu, says a lower court incorrectly allowed the case to proceed by expanding precedent on when federal prison inmates can sue officials for deliberate indifference to their medical needs.

Inmate Kekai Watanabe suffered serious injuries when assaulted while in at Honolulu’s Federal Detention Center in 2021. Watanabe said in his lawsuit that he repeatedly requested treatment for severe injuries, but nurse Nielsen only told him to take over-the-counter medication for his pain.

In his petition for review, Nielsen argues that Watanabe should not have a right to sue under Bivens for his injuries. “Preserving what remains of Bivens does little good,” Nielsen wrote, arguing that the doctrine should be overturned. “Bivens is now little more than a ‘zombie.’ It offers only ‘false hope … invit[ing] still more ‘protracted litigation destined to yield nothing.’ And it disserves the interests of civil rights and ‘the public writ large because, absent [Bivens’] formal abrogation, Congress has no incentive to legislate in the space.’”

I cannot help but believe that SCOTUS sees the Nielsen case as the vehicle in which it can finally drive Bivens off a cliff. The New Republic agrees. On Tuesday, it said that Nielsen v. Watanabe “will give the court an opportunity to further narrow… Bivens claims…” The magazine reported:

Taken together, the justices’ position is that Bivens is unacceptable because it is Congress’s responsibility, not the courts’, to create federal causes of action. When Congress does create those claims, however, the justices’ position is that the courts must sharply narrow them through judicially created doctrines like qualified immunity. Judicial power can only make it harder, not easier, for people to hold accountable those officials who violate their constitutional rights.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

New York Times, Supreme Court Bars Lawsuit After Prison Guards Shaved Inmate’s Dreadlocks (June 23, 2026)

Landor v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corrections & Public Safety, Case No. 23-1197, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2717 (June 23, 2026)

Davis v Passman, 442 US 228 (1979)

Carlson v Green, 446 US 14 (1980)

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 US 120 (2017)

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022)

Courthouse News Service, Supreme Court to review inmate lawsuit over untreated prison riot injury (June 22, 2026)

Nielsen v. Watanabe, Case No. 25-417 (certiorari granted, June 22, 2026)

~ Thonas L. Root

Defendants Waiving The Waiver – Update for June 23, 2026

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LISAStatHeader2small.jpg

SCOTUS HOLDS APPELLATE WAIVERS AREN’T ALWAYS IRONCLAD

Just about the last thing any defendant is concerned with when signing a plea agreement with the federal government is the fine print in which she waives the right to appeal or file a post-conviction 28 USC § 2255 petition or a related motion. The agreed-upon sentence, Guideline factors, dismissed counts, and the US Attorney’s promise not to prosecute for anything else are the important questions. Technicalities like waiving appeal and collateral rights, restitution, supervised release… those provisions are usually just so much noise to a defendant who is negotiating away freedom while trying to minimize the pain.

The appellate and collateral attack waiver is not important.

Until it is.

That is, until the parties’ agreement that the Guideline sentence should be between 33-41 months runs into a judge who thinks the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years is more appropriate. The right to appeal such craziness then becomes vitally important. And that’s when the government waves the waiver at the court of appeals, demanding that your appeal be tossed because, after all, you agreed not to appeal.

In 2024, Munson Hunter III signed a plea deal to plead guilty to aiding and abetting wire fraud. The agreement included the standard appeal waiver. The government dismissed nine other counts as part of the package in exchange for Munson’s agreement to a 51-month sentence.

At sentencing, the court accepted the deal, imposing a 51-month sentence. However, concerned that Munson exhibited conduct that suggested some mental issues, the court added a condition that Munson get mental health treatment while on supervised release and take whatever meds the mental health provider prescribed.

Munson was uninterested in spending his supervised release in a drug-induced stupor and tried to appeal, claiming a 5thAmendment right not to be forced to take pills. The 5th Circuit ruled that his appeal waiver barred him from doing so.

Last week, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit.  Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan explained that “an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.”

The result was not a watershed moment.  After all, eight Circuits already recognize the “miscarriage of justice” exception. But the opinion is notable for the explanation of what constitutes a “miscarriage of justice,” which up to now has been largely an “I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it” standard.

The 8-1 opinion described “miscarriage of justice” as being where

the sentence is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The error must be obvious—not one a judge could reasonably make. And it must be of the type that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Sentencing is a complex affair in our criminal justice system, involving for example the detailed calculation of a Sentencing Guidelines range and the mandatory consideration of multiple sentencing factors. In that endeavor, it is unfortunate but inevitable that mistakes will occur. Such standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver. Were they to do so, the utility of waivers in plea negotiations could plummet: such a provision would have less value to the Government, and so might induce fewer concessions to a defendant. And still more to our point, that kind of standard error is not likely to discredit the judiciary’s commitment to law. But some faults in sentencing can…The point of the miscarriage-of-justice limit, as many appellate courts have properly applied it, is to offer a safety valve for extreme cases—a way out of a waiver when the justice system’s basic integrity is at stake.

Armed with this definition, a well-prepared defendant in many cases may be able to make a compelling showing to get around an appeal waiver. Expect that many cases will follow that include detailed arguments to set aside appeal and post-conviction waivers.

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063, 2026 US LEXIS 2558 (June 18, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Shocking News: BOP Grievance Procedure Deck is Stacked – Update for June 22, 2026

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BOP ADMIN REMEDY PROCEDURE – THE HOUSE ALWAYS WINS

A study by The Marshall Project and NPR published last week reported that the BOP’s grievance system – the BP-9, BP-10 and BP-11 – has inmate failure baked in.

I have not been this shocked by a revelation since learning that professional wrestling is fixed.

Reviewing BOP remedy filings for 2023, the latest year for which data are available, the study found that out of about 40,000 grievances filed in Fiscal Year 2023, 75% were rejected for being inconsistent with the BOP’s arcane procedural rules (too few copies of attachments provided, failure to enclose a copy of a lower-level denial, late filing). Of the 10,000 or so that made the procedural cut, only about 700 were granted.

Overall, the BOP’s grant rate is somewhere under 2% of the remedies filed. Like shooting craps with the house winning 49 out of 50 times.

The TMP/NPR report noted that the grievance process has gotten much worse in the past 20 years. The rate at which the Bureau granted grievances has fallen from just under 7% in 2000 to its current rate, a decline of 70% in 20 years.

“The program is intended to solve problems and be responsive to issues raised by inmates,” Randilee Giamusso, a BOP representative, wrote in an email to TMP/NPR, “and does not prevent inmates from pursuing litigation.”

Of course it doesn’t. And vandals are wrecking President Trump’s perfect beautification of the Reflecting Pool.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, passed in 1995, requires prisoners to complete all available administrative remedies as a condition of bringing suit. Other litigation, such as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requires exhaustion (but excuses it in rare cases where exhaustion would be futile, something that the BOP’s 2% approval rate should be considered to be “all the time”).

Contrary to Ms. Giamusso’s assurance, in Fiscal Year 2025 alone, over 1,770 federal court cases grappled with failure-to-exhaust-remedies claims raised by the government. In other words, the government uses failure-to-exhaust as a bludgeon to get inmate lawsuits dismissed on a regular basis.

The TMP/NPR study followed the medical travails of inmate Terri Mollica, whose serious condition was identified by physicians but needed surgery was withheld, and whose BP-9 was not answered for over 6 months. Mollica’s final level internal remedy to the BOP Central Office was never logged as received, leading to her lawsuit against the BOP being thrown out. The Circuit’s dry recitation of Terri’s history of trying to get the BOP to “solve problems and be responsive to issues raised by inmates” (as Ms. Giamusso so chirpily puts it) tells the story:

•   On October 31, 2019, McGuire-Mollica filed an informal resolution form with the prison. She requested to “see a specialist/surgeon to determine the best course of action, within the next 30 days.” The next day, prison officials returned her form as unresolved.

•   On December 4, 2019, McGuire-Mollica submitted a request for administrative remedy using a BP-9 form. She explained that she “ha[d] not received any treatment or additional consults for this problem” and renewed her request for “an outside specialist or surgeon.” On June 23, 2020, the acting warden responded to her request by confirming that she had a “scheduled appointment with an OB/GYN specialist.”

•   On June 26, 2020, McGuire-Mollica filed an appeal using a BP-10 form. She continued to demand to see a surgeon. On December 21, 2020, the regional director denied her request because there was “no evidence of a May 2017 diagnosis of a malignant uterine growth” in her medical records and “[s]urgical intervention was not recommended.”

•   On October 1, 2020, McGuire-Mollica mailed an appeal using a BP-11 form. McGuire-Mollica mailed this appeal before receiving the regional director’s response to her BP-10 form, but the regional director’s time to respond had already expired, which allowed the prisoner to “consider the absence of a response to be a denial.” She signed the BP-11 form and listed a certified mail tracking number on it. But prison officials contend that they never received the form, as the SENTRY database that tracks the status of all administrative grievances has no record of the BP-11 form being filed.

•   On October 27, 2020, 26 days after she submitted the BP-11 form, McGuire-Mollica filed pro se a complaint in the district court. She alleged that the Bureau of Prisons and its officials had violated her rights under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Eighth Amendment. And she attached exhibits to substantiate her claims, including copies of her administrative grievance filings and an affidavit alleging that “the officers/staff at this prison ha[ve] been tampering with [her] legal mail and denying [her] access to the Courts.”

•   On July 1, 2022, McGuire-Mollica filed—still pro se—an amended complaint. She listed several prison staff and officials as defendants and described their involvement in the denial of her request.

•   On October 19, 2023, the prison staff moved to dismiss the amended complaint. They contended that McGuire-Mollica failed to exhaust her administrative remedies… They argued that she did not complete the final step of the process of “appeal[ing] the response from the Regional Office to the General Counsel level.” McGuire-Mollica responded that she filed the BP-11 form when she submitted it to prison officials for mailing. And she explained that she “ha[d] done all administrative remedies that were available to her” because she could not “control the mail, whether the [Bureau]’s employees actually process or respond to the form, or even when or if the remedy is logged into the [Bureau] system.”

•   On March 8, 2024, the magistrate judge granted the motion to dismiss. She explained that ‘[g]iven the clear conflict between the parties’ allegations, the court must accept as true McGuire-Mollica’s version of events—that she mailed her final appeal to the General Counsel.’ But… ‘although McGuire-Mollica properly completed and mailed her final appeal, it was never ‘logged into the Administrative Remedy Index as received’ and ‘[b]ecause her appeal was never received and logged into the Administrative Remedy Index, it was never considered ‘filed.’ She also dismissed the amended complaint because ‘when McGuire-Mollica filed her [original] complaint, the General Counsel’s time to respond had not expired’ such that ‘the administrative remedy process had not been completed.

So the BOP’s non-resolution of Terri’s problem only took a year.  Seldom has a ‘no’ been delivered with such alacrity.

See how well it works, Ms. Giamusso?

The 11th Circuit reinstated the case after attorneys for the MacArthur Justice Center proved that she had tried to follow every step, but officials had failed to record her final appeal.

The report noted that the BOP’s approval rate “appears to be far below that of many state corrections departments, the news organizations found, though departments track such data in different ways. In California, officials granted roughly 15% of grievances and appeals in 2023… In Georgia, nearly 13% of cases were “granted, partially granted or resolved” that year, according to the department. In Texas state prisons, over 4% of complaints and appeals processed that year were “resolved in inmate favor” — a very small portion, but about twice the BOP’s rate.

Ms. Giamusso told TMP/NPR that the agency is working on “updates and additional guidance” on the remedy procedure. However, nothing to that effect has been proposed in the Federal Register, suggesting that a fix – if one is being planned at all – is years away.

NPR,  ‘Rejected’: How federal prisons stonewall grievances and deny care for years (June 17, 2026)

McGuire-Mollica v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 146 F.4th 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

‘Dopers With Guns’ Decision Disappoints the Narratives – Update for June 19, 2026

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SUPREMES AVOID BROAD BRUSH ON HEMANI

Everything these days comes with a narrative. The Knicks only lose one game since April because President Trump was there, but win the next game because Taylor Swift brings the magic. Antifa “operatives” spiked the Reflecting Pool with algae before being arrested by Park Police.

Narratives attach to Supreme Court cases as well.

Yesterday, SCOTUS decided that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – which prohibits people who illegally use controlled substances from possessing guns – could be unconstitutionally applied in certain uses. Defendant Ali Hemani was caught with cocaine, some weed and a gun in his home, and charged under § 922(g)(3). The US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas threw out the case, holding that making gun possession a felony because Ali liked to blow a little dope violated his 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The 5th Circuit agreed.

The high court’s decision is a “rollicking opinion” that is “worth a read,” the Wall Street Journal said this morning. “Yet it provides few hints of how to draw the line in tougher cases.”

President Trump’s Dept of Justice brought the case to the Supreme Court. The narrative was that DOJ thought it had the perfect unsympathetic defendant, a dual US and Pakistani citizen who had ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and went to Iran to honor Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, killed by a US drone strike. The government claimed Ali’s mother was seen on video saying she hoped her sons would become martyrs for Iran. The narrative was that SCOTUS thought that slamming a bum like Ali would be an easy lift.

Others (including me) thought that the Supreme Court could use a slam-dunk 2nd Amendment case like finding Ali Hemani, who used a little recreational pot and owned a Glock, was constitutionally protected, as a springboard to addressing the stickier questions about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), the subsection that bans all felons from ever possessing a gun.

Yesterday, the Court disappointed both narratives, holding in a 9-0 opinion that as applied to Ali, § 922(g)(3) violated his 2nd Amendment rights. The opinion, by Justice Neil Gorsuch, was painfully minimalist:

In many respects, this case is a narrow one. We do not address efforts to ban addicts… or those presently intoxicated, from possessing a firearm. We do not address other prophylactic laws Congress might adopt after determining that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms… We do not address 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s provision disarming individuals convicted of felonies (often including drug-related ones). Ibid. We do not even address whether the government could bring a prosecution under § 922(g)(3) accompanied by individualized proof that the defendant’s use of marijuana (or any other drug) renders him a danger to himself or others. Or proof that a certain drug always renders its users dangerous because of its potency or for some other reason. None of those issues is before us and we do not pass on them either way.

Not that other Justices were unwilling to raise other issues. Justices Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan, the two who concurred in the judgment only, complained that they wanted to see a narrower opinion. Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Sonia Sotomayor spend five pages of their own blasting the New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen test – on which modern 2nd Amendment jurisprudence turns – as a “failed… experiment” that should be overturned.  Justice Clarence Thomas was expansive in a different direction, writing his own concurring opinion that all of § 922(g) stretches the Commerce Clause too far: “Congress cannot regulate the possession of every thing that ever traveled across state lines.”

Now packing heat legally….

So Hemani is a win for what Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman estimates to be the “few thousand people have been convicted and sentenced under § 922(g)(3) in the last decade, and there could be many thousands more with such a conviction on their records. But, as just noted, Hemani does not necessarily make all these convictions suspect unless the case facts are similar to those in Ali Hemani’s prosecution.”

For those who hoped the case would be a blaze on the trail to getting the 2nd Amendment read into § 922(g)(1), however, Hemani falls short.

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2559 (June 18, 2026)

Sentencing Law and Policy, How many (thousands of) 922(g)(3) convictions are now suspect after Hemani? (June 18, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

No Retro, No Concrete Proposals, Sentencing Commission Says – Update for June 18, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION WAVES AS ITS CAR CAREENS OFF THE CLIFF

The US Sentencing Commission is down two commissioners (operating with five instead of seven). The terms of two more commissioners expire at the end of this year. Absent quick work by the Trump administration in nominating people that the Senate is willing to confirm (who can forget Trump’s last picks, which included Judge Henry “Hang ‘Em High” Hudson?), we may again have a legally impotent USSC as of January 1, 2027.

When the USSC last lost its quorum in December 2018, five years passed without any amendments being adopted. Trump, in office at the time, apparently saw the Commission as pretty low priority, taking a single stab at populating the Commission and then giving up. It took Biden appointing enough commissioners to fill the chairs again, with the first amendments to the Guidelines since November 2018 adopted in November 2023.

Last week, the Commission published its proposed priorities for the coming year, two broad-brush proposals that are a departure from the specific proposals of years past (such as the methamphetamine tables or theft/fraud loss calculations). Instead, the USSC proposes to undertake an evaluation of the guidelines and federal sentencing practices in light of the Commission’s mission set forth in statute and to “undertake a comprehensive review of the Rules and consider whether any amendments to such Rules may be appropriate to further the agency’s statutory purposes and enhance public engagement with and understanding of the Commission’s work.

This is unmitigated squishiness, much more a navel-gazing existential introspection than a serious consideration of substantive changes in the guidelines to reflect justice or reality.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week that “[i]t seems increasingly likely that the USSC will be without a quorum for the start of 2027 and maybe for years thereafter. That may explain why we are getting two broad ‘review’ proposed priorities rather than any specifics.”

The Commission last week published a Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Certain 2026 Amendments, which examined three proposed amendments in the 2026 package sent to Congress last month. If two of these Guidelines, the “inflationary adjustments amendment” and the “multiple counts amendment,” were made retroactive, nearly 5,000 federal prisoners would be eligible for an 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction.

But they won’t be made retroactive. The Commission reports that it “has chosen to not solicit public comment or hold a hearing on retroactivity. When the Commission submits amendments to Congress, it may decide to publish an issue for comment and hold a hearing on whether to make some or all of those amendments retroactive… The Commission is not taking these steps for any of the amendments submitted to Congress on April 30, 2026.”

Apparently, three Commissioners supported retroactivity for the inflationary adjustment Amendment to USSG § 2B1.1 (the theft-fraud guideline. Unfortunately,  28 USC § 994(a)(2) requires four votes for Commission action, including on retroactivity.

Prof Berman wrote, “There is a reasonable basis to believe that, had the USSC had a full slate of Commissioners, there likely could have been a fourth vote for making at least the inflationary adjustments retroactive. But even though it seems a majority of the five current Commissioners would have voted for retroactivity, that’s not sufficient because there is a statutory requirement of four total votes for the USSC to formally act.”

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Certain 2026 Amendments (June 4, 2026)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Sentencing Commission requests input on policy priorities while indicating recent guideline amendments will not be retroactive (June 11, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

From the Sublime to the Absurd at the BOP – Update for June 16, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SEX, PRISON FOOD, AND UNSERIOUSNESS

Serious stuff:   US District Judge Royce Lamberth (District of Columbia), who has been hearing a series of challenges to the Trump administration’s anti-transgender prison policies, granted a preliminary injunction last week prohibiting the Federal Bureau of Prisons from transferring 14 transgender prisoners biological men identifying as women) to men’s facilities while their lawsuit if pending, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their 8th Amendment claims. 

Judge Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, previously enjoined the BOP from  “tapering” hormone therapy for transgender prisons. The BOP has sought a stay of that order from the DC Circuit.

Meanwhile, in the Northern District of Alabama, a female inmate has filed a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit against a BOP correctional officer (who is already facing criminal charges) alleging that she was raped and sexually assaulted more than 20 times at FCI Aliceville.

According to the lawsuit, Corrections Officer Felix Wilder began grooming the plaintiff in October 2023, directing her into isolated areas of the facility where he forced her to have unprotected sex on more than 20 occasions through September 2024.

Worrisome Stuff:  In response to a May 1, 2026, BOP request for information from vendors about interest in outsourcing food service, commissary, and health care across all 122 BOP institutions nationwide, the Center for Science in the Public Interest and the Carceral Nutrition Project wrote to Congress last week urging that any privatization plan be abandoned.

“Outsourcing BOP food and canteen services to a private company will not make incarcerated people healthy again,” said CNP founder Daniel Rosen, contributor to a recent CSPI report on prison food privatization, wrote. “It won’t create healthy prisons, or healthy communities, as RFK, Jr., has promised. It’s a corporate giveaway, and it prioritizes profit at the expense of people’s health and public safety.” 

CSPI and CNP told Congress that, while a number of states have calculated that privatizing carceral food service would save on costs, the report found evidence that outsourcing food service has resulted in inadequate nutrition and portion sizes, inconsistent food safety practices, unpalatable meals due to over- or under-cooking, and spoiled, contaminated, or maggot-ridden food. 

Silly Stuff:  Serial whiners and former reality stars Todd and Julie Chrisley have filed a lawsuit accusing one of their former defense attorneys and his law firm of legal malpractice in the federal criminal case that led to their convictions.

The Chrisleys were convicted of defrauding community banks in the Atlanta area to obtain more than $36 million in personal loans by submitting false bank statements, audit reports, and personal financial statements. They contend that legal mistakes made during the case contributed to their convictions, caused them to spend time in prison, damaged their reputations and separated them from their family.

The complaint alleges that their lawyer lacked significant criminal defense experience and that the firm knew this but pursued the representation because of the publicity associated with the family’s celebrity status (which the family itself pursues on a daily basis).

The federal criminal tax and bank fraud investigation against the couple was based on an unlawful, warrantless search by the Georgia Department of Revenue, the lawsuit contends. The judge granted a defense request to suppress the physical documents from that search, but defense counsel didn’t ask the court to suppress “derivative evidence,” including emails, bank records and financial documents that “formed the core of the government’s case,” the lawsuit says. Federal agents got search warrants to obtain specific documents from the Chrisleys’ email accounts, the lawsuit says, based on that tainted GDR evidence, the lawsuit alleges.

“Without that evidence, the government would not have had sufficient evidence to support a conviction,” the lawsuit says.

Todd Chrisley, who whined endlessly while he was locked up about the suffering he endured at minimum-security FPC Pensacola, now brags that he “ran” his “prison block” and got up every day with the “sole intent… to make the prison employees feel miserable,” according to Reality Tea:

Todd, who vowed to help improve the “evil” prison system following his release, said that his “sole intent” while behind bars was to make the prison employees feel miserable. As if their jobs weren’t already difficult and underpaid, Todd said he wanted to make things worse. He’s truly a class act, said no one.

“I was surrounded by miserable human beings,” Todd told his daughter on her podcast. And if he had a mirror, he could have found another one.

President Trump pardoned both Chrisleys in May 2025. But contrary to how the media portray it, courts don’t like suppressing evidence because, as the Supremes said in United States v. Nixon, “Whatever their origins . . .  exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”

Because the plastic couple never had their convictions overturned, the Chrisleys may face a real challenge in proving that – but for the malpractice – they would have been acquitted.

Washington Examiner, Judge blocks transfer of transgender inmates back to men’s prisons, setting the stage for broader judicial clash (June 12, 2026)

WZDX-TV, Corrections officer already facing felony charges named in new federal lawsuit (June 9, 2026)

CSPI, Letter to House and Senate Judiciary Committees (June 9, 2026)

WAGA-TV, Chrisleys sue former attorney over criminal case defense (June 9, 2026)

Insurance Journal, Chrisleys Sue Former Defense Attorney, Alleging Malpractice in Conviction (June 15, 2023)

Reality Tea, Todd Chrisley Boasts About Prison Stay: ‘I Ran My Block’ (August 15, 2025)

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

~ Thomas L. Root

Venue Still Means Something, Supreme Court Says – Update for June 15, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘VENUE’ IS WHERE YOU DO IT, NOT WHERE IT’S FELT

The Supreme Court last Thursday handed down a rare decision narrowing the government’s ability to do mischief with criminal venue.

About 20 years ago, I was having lunch with an attorney who was only a few weeks into private practice after a long career as an Assistant US Attorney. He was no backbencher: as an AUSA, he had handled some pretty heavy terrorism and organized crime cases.

We were discussing a criminal tax case the government had brought against an out-of-district defendant, a prolix indictment in which a few counts were based on conduct that had occurred within the district while a substantial majority related to acts that had occurred entirely outside of the district. When I suggested to him that the out-of-district counts had a serious venue problem, he scoffed, “Venue is nothing. It can always be waived.”

“Um, not really,” I responded. “You’re thinking about venue in a civil case. That’s easily waived and nearly as easily overlooked. For criminal venue, you should check out the 6th Amendment.”

As seldom as I am correct, I cherish the memory that I was right about that. Within a month, the court had thrown out seven of the nine counts in the indictment for lack of venue.

The idea behind venue is that a defendant should be tried where the crime occurred and the evidence is located, simply as a matter of fairness to the defendant. Still, criminal venue usually gets little respect. First, venue need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, when the crime is a “continuing offense,” it can be tried in any district in which any element of the offense was committed. Third, the criminal code and precedent are full of exceptions and work-arounds: when professional baseball player Darryl Strawberry was charged with tax evasion for filing a tax return in California (where he lived) that omitted a lot of cash he had received over the prior year, he and his agent were charged in the Southern District of New York, because Darryl had sold some memorabilia at a baseball card show there, and the cash he received was subsequently not declared in his tax return. Good enough for venue, the court said. (Darryl was convicted of tax evasion, but he was pardoned by President Trump – himself no fan of the IRS – last year).

And we won’t even try to bring up the Vicinage Clause and the Yellowstone Zone of Death. That’s a discussion for another time.

Last week’s decision was a breath of fresh air, despite some suggesting it is a narrow ruling.  As a Twitter employee in San Francisco, Ahmad Abouammo took money from the Saudi Arabian government for providing personal information on Saudi dissidents and passed it along to a high-level official in the Saudi royal court. One Red Cross worker who was critical of the Saudi government had his information and thereafter was tortured with electric shocks to an inch of his life.

The count in question at the Supreme Court was whether Ahmad could be tried in San Francisco for violating 18 USC § 1519 by creating a fake invoice on his computer in his second-floor Seattle and emailing it to FBI agents who were waiting downstairs.  The government charged him in San Francisco because that was where the FBI investigation was based, rather than in Seattle where he created the document. Ahmad argued that § 1519’s language made the crime complete when he finished falsifying the document, which occurred in his Seattle office.

The government argued that venue was proper in San Francisco because the investigation Ahmad intended to disrupt with the phony invoice was being run out of the FBI office there. But in last week’s 9-0 decision by Justice Elena Kagan, the justices reversed a 9th Circuit conclusion that the “intent” requirement in § 1519 – which criminalizes falsifying documents in a federal investigation – allows the government to prosecute the defendant where such an investigation is located.

Kagan noted the historical purpose of the venue clause, based on the Declaration of Independence’s complaint that the British Parliament often “transport[ed] us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.” The constitutional right to venue where the crime was committed is guaranteed in Article III (which instructs that “Trial of all Crimes” shall “be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed”) and again in the 6th Amendment (giving defendants the right to a jury “of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”).

To implement that constitutional rule, Kagan wrote, courts generally determine the location of a crime’s “essential conduct elements.” The § 1519 “essential conduct element,” the falsification of a document with intent to do so, makes the crime complete.  The defendant does not need to transmit the document to anyone nor use it in any particular way, because the only proscribed conduct is falsification. Thus, venue must be where falsification occurred.

Kagan rejected the 9th Circuit’s view that because Ahmad intended to obstruct a San Francisco investigation, venue was proper there. “This Court has never looked to a statute’s mens rea elements in considering venue. Nor would it make much sense to do so.” Whatever obstructive effects Abouammo’s false invoice may have had in northern California, they were not elements of his crime. And because that is so, those effects cannot figure in determining where Abouammo’s ‘crime [was] committed.’”

Abouammo v. United States, Case No. 25-5146, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2467 (June 11, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root