Tag Archives: sentencing manipulation

3rd Circuit Losing Patience with “Stash House” Reverse Stings, Approves Easier Standard for Defense Discovery – Update for Friday, September 1, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.


We recall a counter-culture cartoon from the early 1970s criticizing big business getting into the environmental business: one fat cat telling another, “We get paid to make the mess. We get paid to clean it up. Business couldn’t be better.”

mess170901The old punch line comes to mind every time we read another “stash house” reverse-sting case. The story line is well known to everyone except, it would seem, the black guys in the poor part of town. An ATF undercover officer convinces some poor sap to rob a fantasy drug “stash house” that invariably is alleged to contain 10 kilos of drug or more. The unemployed “mark,” who has a felony record that makes getting a job problematic, doesn’t have two nickels to rub together. But he can perform simple math, and the math is 10 kilos of coke at $40,000 a key divided five ways equals a bigger pile of money than he’s ever seen before. So he recruits some other guys as desperate as he is, and they all gather with whatever guns they can find, in order to set off with the undercover guy to the target stash house.

There is no stash house, but there is a SWAT team ready to take them down.

The ATF manufactures the crime. The ATF performs the bust. Business couldn’t be better.

Notice we said “poor black guy.” That’s not a stereotype, but rather an acknowledgement of fact. cover ATF agent, who had developed the scenario from the ground up. The cocaine did not exist. The entirely fictitious 10 kilograms of cocaine triggered a very real 20-year mandatory minimum for Askia, contributing to a total sentence of 264 months in prison — far more than even the statistics show that the defendants trapped in the reverse sting net are overwhelmingly black, so much so that some serious charges of discrimination have been raised against the practice.

From a defense perspective, it’s very hard to make a case for selective prosecution. The prevailing standard pretty much requires that you have the smoking gun in your hand in order to even win the right to engage in discovery to try to find the smoking gun. Exacerbating the problem is the obvious: you’re not arguing your client did not do what the indictment said he did, but rather arguing that how the government ensnared him is so contrary to fairness as to violate his right to due process of law.

The courts do not much like “stash house” cases, but they continue to hold their noses and uphold convictions. That happened earlier this week in Philadelphia, but the 86-page decision lightens the load for defendants attacking the “stash house” scheme and implies that the courts’ patience may be nearing an end.

stash170901The story is quotidian: Acting on what appeared to be insider information from a drug courier, Askia Washington and his three co-conspirators planned to rob a Philadelphia “stash house” where they thought 10 kilos of cocaine were being stored for distribution. They discovered on the day of the robbery that the “stash house” was a trap set by law enforcement. Their “courier” was an under ringleader of the conspiracy received.

His co-conspirators took pleas (getting sentences from 27 months to 180 months). Askia went to trial, beating an 18 USC 924(c) count but losing on the drug conspiracy and Hobbs Act counts. The jury found that the conspiracy involved at least 5 kilograms, and a very old drug possession conviction Askia had was used to increase the mandatory minimum sentence to 240 months.

Before trial, Askia tried to get government records to support his claim that Philadelphia-area “stash house” sting targets were selected by race, but the district court denied him on the ground that he could not show evidence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent, that is, evidence that similarly situated individuals of a difference race or classification were not prosecuted, arrested, or otherwise investigated.

dog170901This of course has the flavor of a dog chasing its tail. You need the evidence you’re trying to obtain in order to get permission to obtain it. But that has heretofore been the standard for getting the right to pursue a selective prosecution claim.

With considerable reluctance, the 3rd Circuit upheld Askia’s conviction and sentence, but not without a lot of misgiving:

In sum, we conclude that the 5 kilograms of cocaine charged in the indictment and found by the jury did not amount to an impermissible manipulation of sentencing factors by the government. To the extent that the fictitious 10 kilogram quantity is relevant, we find too that Washington has shown neither improper manipulation nor prejudice. Nevertheless, we remind the government that we have expressed misgivings in the past about the wisdom and viability of reverse stash house stings. That this case fell on the safe side of the due process divide should not be taken to indicate that all such prosecutions will share the same fate. As one of our colleagues said in a prior case, “I do not find it impossible for the Government to exercise its discretion rationally to set up stash house reverse stings. But I share the concern that this practice, if not properly checked, eventually will find itself on the wrong side of the line.

The Circuit differentiated between “selective prosecution” claims and “selective enforcement” claims. “‘Prosecution’,” the 3rd said, “refers to the actions of prosecutors (in their capacity as prosecutors) and ‘enforcement’ to the actions of law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement personnel.” The key distinction between prosecutors and law enforcement is that prosecutors are “protected by a powerful privilege or covered by a presumption of constitutional behavior”… while FBI and ATF agents “regularly testify in criminal cases” and have their credibility “relentlessly attacked by defense counsel.”

boot170111The Circuit held that in “stash house” cases, a district court may conduct a limited pretrial inquiry into the challenged law-enforcement practice on a proffer that shows some evidence of discriminatory effect, saying that “the proffer must contain reliable statistical evidence, or its equivalent, and may be based in part on patterns of prosecutorial decisions… even if the underlying challenge is to law enforcement decisions.”

Although Askia’s conviction remains in place, the Circuit remanded the case for the district court to permit the limited discovery. If evidence of selective enforcement was developed, the district court is free to dismiss the indictment.

The lone dissenting judge blasted Askia’s 265-month sentence:

Surely, sentences should bear some rational relationship to culpability. Otherwise, the entire enterprise of criminal sanctions is reduced to little more than an abstract matrix of numbers and grids. Yet, on this record, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that Washington would not have conspired to rob a stash house containing, for example, a kilogram less than the 5-kilogram mandatory trigger. No mandatory minimum would have “applied” had this trap been baited with the illusion of a stash house containing four kilograms (translating roughly to upwards of $160,000 in value based on the trial testimony)—thereby placing him beyond the reach of the perceived need to impose a 20-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence.

United States v. Washington, Case No. 16-2795 (3rd Cir., August 28, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root


Bootstrapping Your Way to Enhanced Sentences – Update for January 11, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.


About one out of ten federal offenders is charged with a firearms offense, and just about all of them are charged as felons-in-possession.

guns170111The shorthand is misleading, because literally, 18 USC 922 nowhere uses the word “felony.” But it does talk about a lot of other things. You can commit the offense colloquially called felon-in-possession if you own a firearm or ammunition that has traveled in interstate commerce after (1) being convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison; (2) being under indictment for such a crime; (3) being convicted of any misdemeanor involving domestic violence; (4) being a fugitive from justice; (5) being a drug abuser; (6) being under a civil protection order; (7) being an illegal alien; (8) being dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or (9) having renounced your citizenship.

The statute’s a hot mess, and its byzantine requirements would almost be laughable if the penalty – up to 10 years in prison – were not so serious. We just talked to a Navy veteran the other day who wanted to expunge a domestic violence misdemeanor he had gotten while on leave 22 years ago. He was shocked when we told him that he was committing a 10-year federal felony by owning the shotgun he hunted deer with every year.

Today’s case isn’t about the flaws in the statute, however, but rather the flaws in the system. Dasean Taylor was very much a felon-in-possession. In fact, he must have caught the authorities’ attention as a bona fide bad guy, because law enforcement sent an informant to buy guns from Dasean on three separate occasions.

                            Not a business license…

Catching Desean the first time he sold a gun would have been plenty to hang him as a felon-in-possession. But the Sentencing Guidelines include an arsenal of enhancements that can jack up the sentencing range of a felon-in-possession, and the government pretty clearly wanted Dasean’s hide.

Dasean’s case centered around a 4-level enhancement for trafficking in firearms. The enhancement would apply to Desean if he sold two or more guns, and knew or had reason to know possession of the guns by the buyer was illegal or the buyer was going to use the guns illegally.

To be sure they could hammer Dasean, the authorities had their undercover buyer tell Dasean he was going to file the serial numbers off one of the guns. One of other guns sold was a sawed-off shotgun, illegal to own unless it was registered under 26 USC 5841. The district court held that the sale of those two guns satisfied the trafficking enhancement.

An unfortunate effect of the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines was to institutionalize the practice of sentence manipulation. The drug guidelines increased according to the weight of the drugs sold, so law enforcement would not just make one buy, but rather a number of buys, until a weight threshold was reached. If the offense carried an enhancement for possession of a firearm, the undercover would beg the defendant to find a gun, any gun, that the undercover could buy. The worst examples are the “stash house” robberies, where the ATF agents running the sting would tell tales of a fictitious safe house stacked with kilos and kilos of cocaine. Why tell the perps they could knock over a place and get 4 kilos of coke when it was just as easy to promise 25 kilos?

§ 924 tacks a few years onto a sentence for carrying a gun during a violent or drug crime.
                                           Some guns you just know aren’t for plinking at cans…

In today’s case, Desean complained on appeal that there wasn’t enough evidence to apply the 4-level enhancement to his sentence (giving him 71 months instead of 46 months). Monday, the 1st Circuit affirmed the enhancement and sentence.

The district court found that “the cooperating witness [said] that he [was] going to take the serial number off” and that therefore “Mr. Taylor as a supplier would know [that the transfer] involved some unlawful possession or the use or disposal of the firearm unlawfully.” Dasean said the audio didn’t prove he heard the buyer say that, but the Circuit concluded otherwise., holding that because Taylor must have heard the statement,

then the District Court committed no clear or obvious error — or, for that matter, any error at all — in concluding that Taylor knew or should have known that the removal of a serial number is indicative of “anticipation that the gun will be used in criminal activity,” and thus that Taylor knew or should have known that CW-1 intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.

Now that’s a totem pole of inferences! The Court inferred from the audio that Dasean heard the buyer saw he’d remove the number, it inferred that Dasean knew that removing serial numbers indicates the buyer plans to be up to no good with the gun, and therefore it inferred that Dasean knew or should have known that the buyer intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.

Maybe so, but we think that begs the question. The cooperating witness did not intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or, for that matter, to remove the serial number. Instead, he was buying the firearm (and making the claim) at the behest of law enforcement, without any intention of carrying out his promise. It’s pretty obvious the buyer claimed he wanted to remove the serial number solely to trap Dasean with a higher guideline range. But can a defendant be said to know a b uyer will do something the buyer has no intention of doing when he claims to plan to do so?

It’s just unseemly to lie to someone, and then punish them because you assert they must have believed their lie.

boot170111Of course, there was a sawed-off shotgun, too. Under the National Firearms Act, one may not possess a sawed-off shotgun without registering it with the ATF. But the district court conceded that proper registration of the shotgun was possible, just unlikely. The Court of Appeals agreed, noting among other things that Dasean knew the buyer was up to no good because he “was on notice that CW-1 had expressed during the September transaction an intention to remove the serial number from a firearm.”

We don’t excuse selling guns to people who intend to misuse them, but the entire exercise in pumping up Dasean’s sentence struck us a serious case of bootstrapping.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 15-1775 (1st Circuit, Jan. 9, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root