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The Fine Print Counts In A Deal With the Devil – Update for February 20, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘SHUT UP AND SIGN’ LEADS TO A LOT OF BUYER REMORSE

About 95% of all federal indictments end with a plea agreement where the defendant agrees to take a guilty plea in exchange for government promises that often seem evanescent if not illusory. If I had a dime for every prisoner who has told me that he or she only signed because defense counsel said to, I would be writing this on the beach of my private Caribbean island instead of at a desk looking out at February snow in Ohio.

plea161116Two cases decided last week remind all prisoners – including those who have already signed their plea agreements – that in a plea agreement, every promise counts. A defense attorney’s disservice to the client is never greater than when he or she rushes them into signing a “good deal” without first painstakingly walking the defendant through every provision and explaining it in detail.

Eric Rudolph (remember him?) decided to express his political views by blowing up Olympic venues and abortion clinics. The innocents he slaughtered in the process were just icing on his demented cake. After five years on the lam, Eric was caught dining out of a dumpster in Murphy, North Carolina, and was later convicted of one 18 USC § 844(i) arson offense and five companion 18 USC § 924(c) counts for using a firearm (bombs studded with nails qualify under the statute as “firearms”) in the commission of the arson.

Eric’s approach to the plea agreement was unrepentant. He said he had “deprived the government of its goal of sentencing me to death,” and that “the fact that I have entered an agreement with the government is purely a tactical choice on my part and in no way legitimates the moral authority of the government to judge this matter or impute my guilt.”

Uh-huh. Eric’s statement brings to mind old Gus McRae (Lonesome Dove) addressing outlaw Dan Suggs, who was about to be executed with his brother but expressed only hatred and contempt:

Gus McCrae: I’ll say this, Suggs; you’re the kind of man it’s a pleasure to hang. If all you can talk is guff, you can talk it to the Devil.

supermaxcell240220I’m no fan of mandatory life sentences and even less of the death penalty, but it’s amazing how malleable our principles can be when we’re punched in the face with pure-D evil. Eric undeservedly got a life sentence, which he’s spending in the mountains of Colorado (although he never gets to see them from his concrete cell at ADX Florence).

As part of the plea deal he was proud of for depriving the Feds of the death penalty, Eric waived the right to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including under 28 USC § 2255. But because of what the Court disapprovingly calls “the evergreen litigation opportunities introduced by the categorical approach” to § 924(c) litigation,” Eric – who has apparently decided that freedom some day isn’t such a bad goal – has filed two § 2255s so far. Last week, the 11th Circuit turned down his second one as barred by the plea agreement and, in so many words, told Eric to enjoy his place in the mountains for the rest of his life.

In the last few years, courts have applied the Supreme Court’s “categorical” approach to determining whether an offense is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of 18 USC § 924(c)(3)(A), that is, “an offense that is a felony and has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Even Eric’s district court agreed that after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, his arson offenses were no longer crimes of violence under the federal statute (because one can be convicted of arson for burning down his or her own property). But that didn’t matter, the district court said, because Eric had given away his right to bring a § 2255 motion to correct the error.

Last week, the 11th Circuit agreed. It held that “a plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the Government and a criminal defendant. And because it functions as a contract, a plea agreement should be interpreted in accord with what the parties intended. In discerning that intent, the court should avoid construing a plea agreement in a way that would deprive the government of the benefit that it has bargained for and obtained in the plea agreement.”

Eric’s plea deal, the 11th said, contained the common waiver of the right to bring a collateral attack on his sentence. But Eric argued that the plea deal only prohibited collateral attacks on the sentence, while his collateral attack was on the § 924(c) convictions.

dumpsterfire249220Eric’s argument was a dumpster fire, the Circuit said. “The text of 28 USC § 2255, the history of that same statute, and the habeas corpus right that it codified, all point in the same direction: 2255 is a vehicle for attacking sentences, not convictions.” Starting with the origins of English habeas corpus through the codification of 2255 up to last summer’s Supreme Court Jones v. Hendrix decision (where SCOTUS said “Congress created 2255 as a separate remedial vehicle specifically designed for federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sentences”), the 11th concluded that the history, the plain text of the statute “shows the same, as does Rudolph’s requested relief… [His] motions are collateral attacks on his sentences, so his plea agreements do not allow them.”

Winning his § 2255 would have been a huge deal for Eric. The 18 USC § 844(i) conviction carries a maximum 10-year sentence. Each of the § 924(c) convictions carries a maximum of life. Had Eric been allowed to bring the § 2255, he would have gone from his concrete cell straight to walking the streets (something most of his victims would never enjoy again).

*     *     *

Meanwhile, over in Louisiana, Keesha Dinkins – a front-office worker at Positive Change healthcare clinic – was swept up in a Medicaid billing fraud. She didn’t make a dime from the fraud beyond her normal salary, but her lawyer had her sign a plea agreement for 24 months and restitution of $3.5 million.

positivechange240220Despite the deal she made, she argued that she should not be on the hook to share the restitution equally with Positive Change’s owner (who got a lot more time than she did). Last week, the 5th Circuit told her that it was Positive that it would not Change her restitution:

The criminal justice system in this country relies on plea agreements to provide efficient resolutions to criminal cases. Indeed, over 95 percent of federal criminal cases are resolved without trial. It would undermine the principle that plea bargains are contracts to hold that a party can agree to a specific amount of restitution, supported by record evidence, and then in the next breath, challenge an order imposing that exact amount of restitution.

The 5th observed that her plea agreement provided that “Dinkins — not Positive Change — was responsible for the $3.5 million loss.” That is how the judgment will remain.

Rudolph v. United States, Case No 21-12828, 2024 U.S. App.  LEXIS 3278 (11th Cir., February 12, 2024)

United States v. Johnson, Case No 22-30242, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3487 (5th Cir., February 14, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Bad Advice Kills ‘No-Brainer’ Plea Deal, 10th Circuit Says – Update for January 26, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SIX MINUTES OF BAD ADVICE COST DEFENDANT AN EXTRA 14 YEARS

clockwatcher190620Jonathan Kearn was indicted on three counts alleging he possessed some unsavory and illegal photos of his own children. He was looking at a 30-year sentence when the government threw him a lifeline: it offered him a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea deal with a fixed 10-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to just one of the three counts.

Most plea agreements specify that, while the government and defendant may anticipate the Sentencing Guidelines will recommend a sentence within a certain range, the court is not bound by their anticipations and may impose whatever sentence it believes is appropriate. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), however, lets the government and criminal defendants lock the court into a binary choice: the judge may either accept the plea deal, which comes with an agreement that the defendant will get a certain sentence (or occasionally, a sentence within a certain range) regardless of what the Sentencing Guidelines recommend or the judge prefers.

If the court doesn’t like the sentence specified in the 11(c)(1)(C), it can reject the deal, at which time the defendant can walk away from the agreement and go to trial. So-called (c)(1)(C) pleas are popular with defendants because they provide certainty – defendants either receive the sentence they agreed to or they can withdraw their plea.

tooasy240126Anyone familiar with the draconian sentences usually imposed in child pornography cases would see acceptance of the (c)(1)(C) offer made to Jon as a “no-brainer.” But not Jon’s lawyer. After exhaustively counseling his client about the (c)(1)(C) plea for all of six minutes, learned counsel convinced Jon to reject the offer and proceed to trial. You can guess the end: Jon was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison.

Jon filed a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion, arguing his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase. The district court found that counsel didn’t tell Jon that if the court accepted the plea agreement, he would be guaranteed a 10-year sentence but if the court rejected the plea agreement, he could withdraw the plea. In fact, the district court found counsel failed to explain anything at all about Rule 11.

The district judge granted Jon’s § 2255 motion and let him plead to the 10-year offer. This week, the 10th Circuit upheld the decision.

Jon’s hang-up was that he did not want to stand in open court and “personally describe the facts of his offenses – which involved his daughters – before his family and friends in open court.” Under Rule 11, “[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” This requirement is intended to ensure the accuracy of the plea through some evidence that a defendant actually committed the offense.

But Jon’s lawyer told him that he had to do that in order to accept the plea. This advice, the Court said, was absolutely wrong. “The defendant does not have to provide the factual basis narrative,” the appeals court said. Instead, “[t]he district court may look to answers provided by counsel for the defense and government, the presentence report, or… whatever means is appropriate in a specific case – so long as the factual basis is put on the record.”

dumblawyer180108Jon’s lawyer didn’t know this. The lawyer admitted that he “regularly advised his clients that they would have to admit the facts surrounding the offense… and didn’t know if Mr. Kearn would actually receive a 10-year sentence if he pleaded guilty.”

“In the plea agreement context,” the 10th ruled, “counsel has a critical obligation… to advise the client of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement… Because counsel understated the benefits and overstated the burdens of the plea offer, Mr. Kearn could not make an informed choice about whether to accept it.”

The government argued that Jon could not show that his attorney’s bad advice prejudiced him because there was no evidence Jon would have taken the deal had his lawyer properly advised him. But the Court held that Jon “lacked the requisite information to weigh the options in front of him, and whatever desire he exhibited before trial is not dispositive of what he would have done if he were properly educated about the charges against him… We cannot rationally expect defendants to theorize contemporaneously about the decisions they would make if they were receiving different advice. If courts required this kind of evidence, no defendant could show prejudice.”

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeThe significant disparity between the 10-year sentence Jon was offered and the 24 years he got is very relevant to the prejudice analysis, the Court said. Jon “was not adequately informed that the district court would have been bound by the agreed-upon sentence. Thus, counsel improperly skewed his attention away from the sizeable sentencing disparity he faced in favor of the need for him to personally supply a factual basis… Sentencing disparity is strong evidence of a reasonable probability that a properly advised defendant would have accepted a plea offer, despite earlier protestations of innocence.”

United States v. Kearn, Case No. 23-3029, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1471 (10th Cir. January 23, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

‘You Agreed to an Unconstitutional Conviction,’ 2nd Circuit Says – Update for October 26, 2023

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‘WAIVING’ JUSTICE GOODBYE

plea161116Resolving criminal cases by a plea deal is more than merely common. In the federal system, 98% of all cases end in a plea agreement where the defendant agrees to plead to one or more counts in exchange for the government usually agreeing to do not much at all. Sure, the defendant usually gets a 2-3 level reduction under § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for “acceptance of responsibility” by pleading guilty.

But often enough, the Government’s concessions are illusory while the defendant’s obligations become onerous.  One of the unexploded mines in the agreement is the waiver.  A defendant will waive the right to appeal the conviction or sentence and to bring a collateral attack on the conviction under 28 USC § 2255.

Such a waiver probably doesn’t seem that unfair, at least where waiving the right to appeal is concerned.  A plea agreement, after all, is supposed to end litigation. But what happens when the conviction to which a defendant agrees proves down the road to be unconstitutional?

hobbsact200218That happened to Derek Cook. Derek (like a number of co-petitioners in his case) pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery – 18 USC § 1951(a) – and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence – 18 USC § 924(c). In exchange for the government’s promise not to bring any more criminal charges, Derek agreed to waive a number of rights, including the right to collaterally attack the convictions and sentences under 28 USC § 2255.

But after the Supreme Court held in the 2015 Johnson v. United States case that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague, Derek filed a § 2255 motion in which he correctly argued that his conspiracy charge could no longer be a defined as a crime of violence supporting a § 924(c) conviction. The district court sat on the petition until SCOTUS agreed, definitively holding that, constitutionally, conspiracy could not be the basis for a § 924(c) in the 2019 United States v. Davis decision.

After that, the district court conceded that Derek’s conviction for using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence was unconstitutional. But that didn’t matter, the Court said, because Derek had waived his entitlement to a conviction that was constitutional by signing a plea agreement containing his commitment not to file a § 2255 motion.

Last week, the 2nd Circuit agreed. The Circuit wrote that “while we have not yet considered the precise question of whether collateral-attack waivers are enforceable in the wake of Johnson and Davis, we have made clear that such waivers are generally enforceable in the face of evolving judicial precedent… [T]he possibility of a favorable change in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that accompanies pleas and plea agreements. This principle follows from the fact that plea agreements, like all contracts, allocate risk between the parties – and we are not free to disturb the bargain the parties strike.

pleadeal180104“The enforceability of a collateral-attack waiver,” the 2nd held, “turns on whether the petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary, not the nature of any subsequent legal developments… Petitioners counter that they have a due process right not to be convicted of a non-existent offense. But the question is not whether Petitioners have a right not to be convicted of a non-existent offense. It is whether Petitioners have a right to bring a collateral attack when, in exchange for valid consideration, they executed binding plea agreements admitting their criminal conduct and waiving their ability to challenge the resulting convictions. And on that score, our precedent is clear that ignorance of future rights is unavoidable and not a basis for avoiding a plea agreement.”

Cook v. United States, Case Nos. 16-4107 et al, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 27383 (2d Cir., October 16, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Government Can’t Walk Away From Plea Deal, 4th Says – Update for September 2, 2022

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‘WE DIDN’T AGREE THAT YOU COULD WIN’

The government prefers one-sided plea agreements, but – as a decision last month reminded us – sometimes the U.S. Attorney overreaches.

headsiwin220902(So why am I getting around to reporting this now, a month after the case was handed down? Vacation, county fair, August being August…)

Shelby Petties cut a deal in which the government agreed to drop two counts if he pled to having committed a crime of violence – kidnapping – while having failed to register as a sex offender. Shelby reserved the right to appeal on the ground that while he did the kidnapping, it is not categorically a crime of violence (COV).

Shelby appealed and won a ruling that kidnapping is not a COV. But when the case went back to the district court, the judge allowed the government to refile the dismissed charges against Shelby. The government’s view was that Shelby had agreed to plead guilty in order to appeal an issue that – if he won – the government could circumvent by undoing the agreement.

Shelby argued that the government’s view reduced the benefits he got from the plea agreement to zero. The 4th Circuit agreed.

“We give plea agreements greater scrutiny than we apply to ordinary commercial contracts,” the Circuit ruled, “because of the context: a defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to trial, induced by the government’s commitments in the plea agreement.”

plea161116Here, Shelby gave up his right to go to trial on Count Two in exchange for the government’s promise to dismiss Counts One and Three and to “not further prosecute him for conduct constituting the basis” for the indictment. “The government entered into this agreement with full knowledge that Petties might appeal — and appeal successfully — his conviction on Count Two,” the Circuit held. “The possibility of a successful appeal was a contingency expressly contemplated by the parties and their agreement…”

United States v. Petties, Case No 21-4332, 2022 U.S.App.LEXIS 21158 (4th Cir., Aug 1, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Butterfly Wings Don’t Beat For Innocence – Update for July 7, 2022

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THE BEIJING BUTTERFLY

butterfly220707When mathematician Edward Lorenz first posited the notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing today could affect the path of a tornado in Kansas three weeks hence, his fanciful illustration became the interface with chaos theory that the average Joe and Jane could understand. Essentially, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.

When a federal defendant is presented with a plea agreement and told by her lawyer that it’s the best deal she can hope for, the fine print is rarely explained. That includes Section 10(b)(1)(A)(iii) on page 12 which says something like “Defendant waives the right to challenge the conviction or sentence under 18 USC § 3742 or on any collateral attack under 28 USC § 2255 or other section, except in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

pleawaiver220707And why not sign it? The defendant is under plenty of stress as she contemplates agreeing to spending a decade in prison, and a lot of that gibberish in the back of the plea agreement means a lot less to her than her attorney’s blandishments that the judge certainly won’t give her more than 48 months.

In chaos theory parlance, the appeal/collateral attack waiver is a pretty small input. Only later does the output become huge.

The Supreme Court left for vacation in time for the 4th of July. Like a fireworks display, the finale was stellar and stunning: abortion, guns, prayer, and the biggest case of all, a decision that may spell doom for the administrative state. But just like many fireworks finales, after the final glowing detonation fades, one straggler rocket goes airborne, with no light but a surprise reverberating boom.

Last Thursday, the Court released its final list of certiorari grants and denials for the term, announcing the one or two cases it will add to next term’s docket while denying a long list of petitions. One of the denials was a guy named Zenon Grzegorczyk (pronounced just the way it sounds). Zenon, a good father, wanted to murder six people whom he blamed for his divorce and for the loss of custody of his child. He hired and paid hitmen to pull it off.

hitman220707Problem was that Zenon, not being an avid news consumer, was unaware that all hitmen available for hire are undercover law enforcement officers, moonlighting for some pocket money. Thus it was in this case. Zenon was promptly charged with murder for hire (18 USC § 1958) and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

Zenon signed a plea agreement in which, among other things, he waived any right to challenge his murder-for-hire and firearms convictions. He was sentenced to about 18 years.

A couple of years later, after the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya that crimes of violence had to be accompanied by use or threat of force, Zenon filed a § 2255 motion challenging the firearms conviction. Because of his plea agreement, the District Court denied the motion, and the 7th Circuit affirmed. Zenon filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Davis that a conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not itself a violent offense that could support an 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The government flipped its position, asking the Supreme Court to vacate the 7th Circuit’s judgment because Davis made Zenon actually innocent of the 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The mechanism is called a “GVR,” because the Supremes grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the lower court’s decision, and remand the case for further consideration, all in one order.

judgeB160229The Supreme Court refused, denying the petition last week. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in a concurrence to the denial that “[b]ecause the 7th Circuit correctly concluded that the defendant’s unconditional guilty plea precluded any argument based on the new caselaw, this Court has no appropriate legal basis to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.”

What is notable was the spirited dissent written by Justice Sotomayor. She argued that Zenon’s case

falls comfortably within this Court’s longstanding GVR practice… The Solicitor General’s considered concession that 18 USC § 1958(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A) is an intervening development that has triggered the Government’s agreement to forgo assertion of the procedural bar that proved decisive below. Consequently, there is surely a reasonable probability of a different result on remand: With the Government waiving the procedural bar, Grzegorczyk’s § 924(c) conviction and 5-year sentence should be vacated, and his § 1958(a) sentence reduced by at least 2 years and 7 months. Moreover, given the stakes for Grzegorczyk, as well as the Government’s express consent, this is a case where the marginal cost to judicial efficiency and finality from a remand should yield to solicitude for Grzegorczyk’s rights. “Further proceedings” are therefore “just under the circumstances,” 28 USC § 2106, and the Court should issue a GVR order.

“By denying certiorari rather than issuing a GVR order,” Justice Sotomayor fumed, “the Court allocates the full cost of the Government’s error to Grzegorczyk, who faces over 7½ extra years of incarceration as a result.”

innocent210504What this means, of course, is that actual innocence of a count of conviction will always yield to an oppressive appeal waiver signed in haste by a defendant who is understandably focused on the larger issues in her plea agreement rather than flitting butterfly of a provision, whose wingbeats seem inconsequential at the time but may later spawn a tornado of injustice.

In his concurrence, Kavanaugh suggested that if the government really felt that Zenon was entitled to relief from the five -year 924(c) sentence, “the Attorney General may recommend a pardon or commutation to the President, and the President may pardon the defendant or commute the sentence.”

Like that’s gonna happen…

Grzegorczyk v. United States, Case No. 21-5967, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3273 (June 30, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Waive It ‘Goodbye’? – Update for November 5, 2021

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ONE AIN’T DONE

oneanddone200616A lot of possible objections or defenses can be waived if they aren’t raised at the right time. If a defendant doesn’t raise an objection to the indictment or venue or speedy trial before the jury is seated, the objections are lost. Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lists a whole bevy of such issues.

Many other rights are often waived if the defendant enters into a plea agreement with the government. Such rights, which have to be specifically and expressly waived in the plea agreement, usually include the right to appeal, the right to file other types of post-conviction challenges, and even – often enough – the right to file requests for documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

A plea waiver is common and enforceable. But the government has to raise the defense of plea waiver in order to get any traction. Let’s say a defendant signs a plea deal with the government that includes a promise not to appeal or bring a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence. Later, she files a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 claiming, for example, her lawyer screwed up at sentencing. If the government doesn’t raise the plea waiver as a defense at the time it files its objection to the § 2255 motion, it can’t come back later and assert the defense.

It’s “one and done.”But how long is “done?” Derrick Borden found that out last week. Despite having signed a plea waiver that prevented any post-conviction challenges to his conviction, Derrick filed motion to vacate his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis invalidated the basis for that count. The government, agreeing that the § 924(c) conviction should be vacated, did not raise the plea waiver as an objection.

After the § 924(c) was vacated, Derrick was resentenced. Not liking how that turned out, he appealed the new sentence as being too much. The government raised the plea waiver as a defense to the new § 2255, arguing Derrick had no right to appeal.

Derrick argued that the government – having waived its right to invoke the waiver against his first § 2255 motion – was not allowed to selectively enforce the plea deal, and that the letter it wrote the district court waiving the waiver the first time around should be read to have abandon its right to enforce the waiver for all time.

Waivers160215Last week, the 2nd Circuit turned him down, apparently a bit miffed that Derrick tried to sandbag the government for having done the right thing. “To start, the Circuit said, “consenting to permit Borden to move to vacate his § 924(c) conviction was in Borden’s interest, in the interest of judicial economy, and in the interests of justice… we see no reason to discourage the Government from consenting to the correction of a constitutional error by offering limited relief from an appeal waiver (or waiver of other post-conviction relief) that benefits the defendant.”

The 2nd said the government’s letter let Derrick “obtain precisely the relief he sought. And although courts construe plea agreements strictly against the government, that standard does not necessarily extend to a letter that is not a separate plea agreement upon which the defendant relied in waiving any rights.

United States v. Borden, Case No. 19-4316-cr, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32030 (2d Cir., Oct. 26, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Lousy Lawyering and Other Stories – Update for April 27, 2021

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“DID I SAY FIVE YEARS? I MEANT FIVE DECADES…”

Four decisions of note last week:

stupidlawyr191202Oops, My Bad: Dave Mayhew was charged with white-collar fraud. The government offered him a plea deal that promised a maximum sentence of five years.

“C’mon, man,” his lawyer said. “That’s no deal. If we go to trial, five years is the worst we can do.” Dave, who paid big bucks for this professional advice, followed his attorney’s guidance and went to trial.

You can guess what happened. Dave lost, and he was sentenced to 27 years.

After appeals were over, Dave filed a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective for giving him such bad advice. The district court denied the petition, pointing out that Dave was told at his re-arraignment that he could get up to 55 years on all of the charges and the court – no one else – would decide the sentence. So Dave knew what he was getting into, the judge claimed, and that cured any prejudice he would have suffered from his lawyer’s idiocy.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed. The re-arraignment came only after Dave had rejected the plea deal. The Circuit admitted that in the usual lousy-advice-on-sentence-exposure case, the law is clear that if the defendant pleads guilty after a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing, the court’s warning that only it would determine the sentence and that the maximum the defendant faces, “taken together, may well have been enough to cure… counsel’s misadvice. But there is a fundamental problem,” the 4th held, “with applying that principle here, and it has to do with timing: The court’s admonitions in this case came only after Dave already had rejected the government’s plea offer, and there is no indication — in the record or from the government on appeal — that the offer remained open at that point.”

Bait and Switch: Rebecca Stampe made a deal on her drug case, agreeing to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea locking her sentence at 168 months. An 11(c)(1)(C) plea sets a particular sentence or sentence range, with the court’s role limited to honoring the sentence deal or rejecting the guilty plea.

Deal170216Becky’s deal came with a government promise that if she testified against her co-defendant, she might get a substantial-cooperation sentence reduction under USSG § 5K1.1. But after she made the plea deal, the government dismissed the case against her co-defendant because of some unspecified misconduct by the informant (which presumedly made the informant’s testimony worthless).

Becky demanded information about the misconduct under Brady v Maryland, arguing that it was material to her guilt as well. She also moved to withdraw from her plea agreement (but not her guilty plea), figuring she’d do better with an open plea that let the court sentence her than she would with a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea.

Last week, the 6th Circuit shot her down. The Circuit ruled that the evidence could not possibly be material to Becky’s defense, because she had already pled guilty, so there was no defense left to make. As for the plea agreement, the Circuit said, “While we do not doubt that Stampe sincerely believed that she might avoid some prison time because of her putative cooperation in her co-defendant’s case, the plea agreement contemplated but did not require that possibility. So contrary to her assertion on appeal, it was not the ‘principal purpose’ of the agreement. The main purpose was the exchange of her plea for the government dropping the other charge against her and agreeing to a 168-month sentence.”

mathisEnd Run: John Ham filed a 28 USC § 2241 habeas petition claiming that Mathis v United States – a Supreme court decision that dictated how a sentencing court should apply the “categorical approach” in deciding whether a prior crime was a “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act – required that he be resentenced to a lot less time.

John figured that the 4th Circuit’s United States v. Wheeler decision authorized the district court to address his § 2241 petition on the merits. The district court disagreed, and Jim appealed.

Wheeler adopted a four-part test for using § 2241 petitions to attack a defective sentence where a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.” One of those tests is that a petitioner must show a retroactive change in substantive law that happened after the direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.

John claimed that Mathis satisfies that requirement, changing “well-settled substantive law” about how a sentencing court should apply the categorical approach. Last week, the 4th Circuit disagreed.

“Mathis itself made clear that it was not changing, but rather clarifying, the law,” the 4th held. “The categorical approach has always required a look at the elements of an offense, not the facts underlying it… Indeed, Mathis merely repeated the ‘simple point’ that served as ‘a mantra’ in its ACCA decisions: ‘a sentencing judge may look only to the elements of the offense, not to the facts of the defendant’s conduct’.”

abandoned210427jpgSee You Around, Chump: Finally, in the 8th Circuit, Charles Ahumada filed a § 2255 motion arguing his attorney abandoned him by failing to file a petition for rehearing on his direct appeal. Not so, the Circuit said. In order to make a 6th Amendment ineffective assistance, a defendant first has to have a constitutional right to counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel on a discretionary appeal, and a petition for rehearing is exactly that.

Chuck admitted as much, but argued that the Circuit’s Criminal Justice Act plan requiring counsel to file non-frivolous appeals gave him a due process right to effective counsel. “Even assuming there was a breach of the statute, the CJA,” the 8th said, “it does not give rise to a claim for ineffective representation of counsel.”

United States v. Mayhew, Case No 19-6560, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11248 (4th Cir., April 19, 2021)

United States v. Stampe, Case No 19-6293, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11459 (6th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ham v. Breckon, Case No 20-6972, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11493 (4th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ahumada v. United States, Case No 19-3632, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11861 (8th Cir., April 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Don’t Listen to the Judge – Update for September 17, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SHUT UP, YOUR HONOR

You’d think that when a federal judge tells you that a plea offer stinks, you could take that to the bank.

shutup200917That didn’t happen for Seneca Harrison. After he was charged with an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) felon-in-possession, the government offered him a 70-87 month plea deal. At Seneca’s change of plea hearing, the judge – upon hearing the deal – threw the Assistant United States Attorney out of the courtroom, and then told Seneca the federal (as opposed to the state) system “sucks” and is “really harsh.” The judge advised Seneca he’d get a better deal going to trial.

So Seneca did what the judge suggested… and he got hammered. Because going to trial took away his Guidelines acceptance-of-responsibility points, his sentencing range increased. He was sentenced to 92 months.

Last week, the 10th Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case to a different judge for resentencing. Everyone agreed that the judge’s comments on the plea violated F.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). And Seneca was prejudiced by it, because there was a reasonable probability he would have taken the government deal if the court had kept its mouth shut. To be sure, the district court’s comments were “inappropriate. Commenting on the sentencing practices of another judge and making disparaging remarks about the federal system harms the public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Harrison, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28621 (10th Cir Sept. 10, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Lord, Save Us From Parents… – Update for June 30, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FATHER KNOWS BEST

Seldom is a defendant is such a mess that the advice of his family or friends cannot make things worse. That’s what happened to David Day.

David faced a messy white-collar case, one that could easily yield a Guidelines sentence of more than 90 months. His public defengoodlawyer160314der was top-drawer (as full-time public defenders usually are): she could assess a loser of a case, and she did, negotiating a government offer for a 51-month sentence.

But parents always want the best for their kids. Although David was in his mid-30s, his Dad figured prominently in planning his defense. And Dad, who had seen all of the relevant TV shows,  figured a court-appointed lawyer couldn’t possibly be any good. He convinced David to reject the offer, and then to dump his PD in favor of hiring two lawyers Dad knew, both whom could smell a fee and thus told David he could easily beat the case.

Things went downhill fast.

After the new lawyers collected their fee, paid over several months (by Dad), they entered their appearance in the case. The government generously re-offered the 51 month deal, but the new lawyers – without ever opening the case files, which they had not yet bothered to pick up from the public defender – told David to reject 51 months and go to trial.

toast200630A few weeks later, the new lawyers finally picked up the files and read the discovery. For the first time, they could see that David was toast. They convinced him to plead, but by then there was no deal. He entered an open plea, which is a plea to the whole indictment without any deal whatsoever. When all the dust settled, David got 92 months.

David filed a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion, arguing the hired lawyers were incompetent for telling him to reject the plea offer without having first read the file. That seems like a pretty basic blunder. But David’s trial judge didn’t think so. She denied the § 2255 motion without a hearing, holding that even if the lawyer had done that, David could not show he was prejudiced by their mistake, because the government’s offered plea agreement would not have bound the court to a particular sentence, so there was no guarantee the judge would have sentenced David to 51 months.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed. The proper inquiry, the Circuit said, is not whether the sentencing court is bound by a plea agreement, but whether it is reasonably probable that the court would have accepted its terms and that the resulting sentence would have been less than the one that was actually imposed.

The 7th complained that the “judge’s prejudice analysis also overlooks the practical realities of plea negotiations. Few court observers would contend that the government’s views as reflected in its plea stipulations and Guidelines recommendations have no influence on a judge’s real-world sentencing decisions… Judges usually follow the nonbinding recommendation in Rule 11 type B agreements in part because they know that not accepting prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations will hamper plea negotiations in future cases. Why would prosecutors offer nonbinding plea agreements — and defendants accept them—if they count for nothing in the sentencing decision?

dumblawyer180108The government weirdly warned the Circuit that ruling in David’s favor would produce “absurd results” by encouraging defendants to engage incompetent attorneys. Of course they would: it makes perfect sense to hire a dummy and get slammed with a lot of time, so that you can roll the dice on your less-than-10% chance that you can win your § 2255 a few years down the road.

Ask David. He’s already served all but 12 months of his 92-month sentence. No doubt he’s happier to have his rights vindicated after he’s done the time he would not have had if he had stuck with his public defender.

The Court, with regal understatement, wrote the government argument “strikes us as an entirely unrealistic concern.”

Day v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19640 (7th Cir. June 24, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

A Short Rocket – Update for March 12, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WE’VE GOT THE SHORTS…

rocket-312767Arson: In a decision approving filing a second-or-successive 2255 motion, the 6th Circuit last week held that because United States v. Davis is retroactive, a defendant who was convicted of 18 USC 844(i) arson and an 18 USC 924(c) use of a destructive device (a Molotov cocktail) could challenge the 924(c) conviction.

The 6th said the defendant’s “924(c) conviction was premised upon his use of a destructive device in furtherance of the 844(i) offense… The question is whether 844(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another… Arson under 844(i) does not appear to qualify as a crime of violence under 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against “any building… used in interstate or foreign commerce,” including one owned by the arsonist… That means defendant’s 924 conviction must have been based on 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated…”

In re Franklin, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6672 (6th Cir. Mar, 3, 2020)

manyguns190423Waiver: The defendant pled guilty to violating 18 USC 924(c) for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence — theft from a firearms dealer under 18 USC 922(u). He filed a 2255 motion claiming after United States v. Davis, a 922(u) violation no longer counts as a crime of violence. But his plea agreement included the waiver of his right to contest the conviction and sentence “on any ground, including any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates directly to this waiver or its negotiation, including any appeal… or any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to, a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255…”

Last week, the 7th Circuit ruled this collateral-attack waiver was valid and barred a Davis challenge to the conviction and sentences.

Oliver v United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6760 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2020)

Fair Sentencing Act: The Defendants were sentenced for crack offenses under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A) prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. After the First Step Act passed, they applied for sentence reductions. The government; argued they were not eligible because the amounts of crack they were found to have been involved with at sentencing were so great that their sentence exposure did not change.

crackpowder160606The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York last week held that the defendants were eligible. It held that “the weight of authority supports Defendants’ interpretation. “[T]he majority of district court cases in this Circuit” have found “that a defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act based upon his offense of conviction, as opposed to his actual conduct… Decisions from other circuits also favor Defendants’ interpretation. See United States v. White, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119164 (S.D. Tex., July 17, 2019) (collecting over 40 cases across the nation that agree with defendants’ interpretation of ‘covered offense’).”

The EDNY court said it “joins the chorus of district courts to hold that eligibility under… the First Step Act is based on the crime of conviction and not a defendant’s actual conduct. Both defendants were convicted of violating 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A), the statutory penalties for which were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. They are both therefore eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”

United States v. Pressley, 2020 US Dist. LEXIS 34973 (EDNY Feb 28, 2020)

ACCA Recklessness: The Supreme Court last week granted certiorari to a case asking whether an offense that involves physical force that is used recklessly – that is, conduct undertaken with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk – is a crime of violence for Armed Career Criminal Act purposes.

A prior case asking the same issue was recently dismissed after the defendant/petitioner died.

Borden v. United States, Case No. 19-5410 (certiorari granted Mar. 2, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root